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How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb: The Case for Deterrence

(Foreign Affairs) Michael Mandelbaum - In order to keep Iran from going nuclear, the Iran deal needs to be supplemented by an explicit, credible threat of military action. To be credible, such a threat must be publicly articulated and resolutely communicated. The Obama administration should declare such a policy itself, as should future administrations, and Congress should enshrine such a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support. The administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of U.S. naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies. As in Europe during the Cold War, the goal of U.S. policy should be to eliminate all doubts, on all sides, that the U.S. will uphold its commitments. A policy of deterrence should not be controversial, since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian bomb. In addition, a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the shortcomings of the agreement without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements. Since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended, it would help ease worries about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years. As during the Cold War, the policy should end only when it becomes obsolete - that is, when Iran no longer poses a threat to the international community. The writer is professor of American foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
2015-09-17 00:00:00
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