Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Foreign Policy) Aaron David Miller and Jason Brodsky - Iran's desire to keep the nuclear weapons option alive as a threshold state is inextricably linked to how the regime sees itself: as a revolutionary, ideological Shiite Islamist cause with legitimate regional ambitions surrounded by hostile Sunni neighbors and a West - particularly an America - that wants it reformed or, worse, overthrown. Driven by a profound sense of insecurity and a deep sense of entitlement, if not grandiosity, Iran's desire for a putative nuclear weapon isn't some discretionary foreign-policy option. As long as the Islamic Republic behaves like a cause and not just a country, the danger that it will choose to weaponize will be ever present. Though President Hassan Rouhani may wax on about the possibilities of cooperation with the U.S. on non-nuclear fronts, in the end, it is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who calls the shots. If we think the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic, economic, and political relationship is on a linear road to recovery, we better reconsider. We don't doubt the desire for change among the Iranian public or the country's reformers - the problem is that they're not running the country and may not be for a very long time. 2015-10-09 00:00:00Full Article
Betting on Reform in Iran
(Foreign Policy) Aaron David Miller and Jason Brodsky - Iran's desire to keep the nuclear weapons option alive as a threshold state is inextricably linked to how the regime sees itself: as a revolutionary, ideological Shiite Islamist cause with legitimate regional ambitions surrounded by hostile Sunni neighbors and a West - particularly an America - that wants it reformed or, worse, overthrown. Driven by a profound sense of insecurity and a deep sense of entitlement, if not grandiosity, Iran's desire for a putative nuclear weapon isn't some discretionary foreign-policy option. As long as the Islamic Republic behaves like a cause and not just a country, the danger that it will choose to weaponize will be ever present. Though President Hassan Rouhani may wax on about the possibilities of cooperation with the U.S. on non-nuclear fronts, in the end, it is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who calls the shots. If we think the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic, economic, and political relationship is on a linear road to recovery, we better reconsider. We don't doubt the desire for change among the Iranian public or the country's reformers - the problem is that they're not running the country and may not be for a very long time. 2015-10-09 00:00:00Full Article
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