Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Institute for National Security Studies) Amos Yadlin - The repeated rounds of fighting in Gaza forced on Israel by Hamas since 2009 have not achieved long-term deterrence, severe damage to the Hamas military wing, the weakening of the organization, or effective constraints on its future military buildup. Hamas, which is preparing for the next confrontation with Israel, is heavily invested in building attack tunnels. The 2014 Gaza war failed to ensure any essential change in the situation over what existed formerly. Another round fought by the same rules is not recommended; it will only exact high costs from both sides while producing no positive results for Israel's long-term security. The optimal situation for Israel vis-a-vis Gaza entails a technological solution for Hamas' attack tunnels. This would postpone the inevitable next round of fighting and put Israel in a better position when it does break out. But no such technical solution is currently ripe for use. Israel must establish that the discovery of cross-border tunnels ready for Hamas attacks requires preemptive action. If such action should escalate into a full-blown conflict, the conflict must be brief but forceful, based on a clear strategic objective that, unlike all previous military encounters, has the potential to effect a fundamental change in the balance of power and the dynamics between the sides. Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin, chief of Israeli military intelligence from 2006 to 2010, is director of INSS.2016-02-15 00:00:00Full Article
Israel's Options in the Face of Hamas Attack Tunnels
(Institute for National Security Studies) Amos Yadlin - The repeated rounds of fighting in Gaza forced on Israel by Hamas since 2009 have not achieved long-term deterrence, severe damage to the Hamas military wing, the weakening of the organization, or effective constraints on its future military buildup. Hamas, which is preparing for the next confrontation with Israel, is heavily invested in building attack tunnels. The 2014 Gaza war failed to ensure any essential change in the situation over what existed formerly. Another round fought by the same rules is not recommended; it will only exact high costs from both sides while producing no positive results for Israel's long-term security. The optimal situation for Israel vis-a-vis Gaza entails a technological solution for Hamas' attack tunnels. This would postpone the inevitable next round of fighting and put Israel in a better position when it does break out. But no such technical solution is currently ripe for use. Israel must establish that the discovery of cross-border tunnels ready for Hamas attacks requires preemptive action. If such action should escalate into a full-blown conflict, the conflict must be brief but forceful, based on a clear strategic objective that, unlike all previous military encounters, has the potential to effect a fundamental change in the balance of power and the dynamics between the sides. Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin, chief of Israeli military intelligence from 2006 to 2010, is director of INSS.2016-02-15 00:00:00Full Article
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