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- Shlomo Avineri
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- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
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- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
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Think Tanks:
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- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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[Washington Post] Dennis Ross - In 1993 and 1996 I helped broker understandings that brought conflicts between Hizballah and Israel to an end. Both times Hizballah instigated warfare with Katyusha rocket fire into Israel and Israel retaliated, determined to damage Hizballah's capacity for making war and to demonstrate to the Lebanese the cost of Hizballah's adventures. And both times, to bring about an enduring cease-fire, we needed to deal with Syria. This time, however, the cease-fire deal was done without the Syrians. Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 will depend to a large degree on the Syrians - unless, of course, the new international force deployed with the Lebanese army can both prevent resupply to Hizballah and bolster Lebanon's military so it can fulfill the role envisioned for it in the resolution. The more determined Syria is to frustrate implementation of the resolution, the more the international force will need a capability and a mandate to be aggressive in stopping efforts to get arms to Hizballah and in preventing its restoration as a fighting force. Will the international force have intensive inspection capability? Will it be deployed along all routes into Lebanon from Syria and be able to inspect all relevant vehicular traffic? Will it set up checkpoints on north-south access routes in Lebanon to do the same? There is every reason to believe the international force will not be able to accomplish such a mission anytime soon. Working in tandem, the Bush administration and the French should try to change the Syrian calculus. We should create a one-two punch with the French to make clear that Syria has something significant to lose by not cutting off Hizballah, and that it has something meaningful to gain from changing course. The Europeans currently provide a critical economic lifeline to the Syrians. Assad must see that Syria will pay an unmistakable price if it tries to block implementation of Resolution 1701. That price could be a joint French-EU and American effort to isolate Syria economically if it is unwilling to end its material support for Hizballah. 2006-08-17 01:00:00Full Article
A Cease-Fire Reality: Dealing With Syria
[Washington Post] Dennis Ross - In 1993 and 1996 I helped broker understandings that brought conflicts between Hizballah and Israel to an end. Both times Hizballah instigated warfare with Katyusha rocket fire into Israel and Israel retaliated, determined to damage Hizballah's capacity for making war and to demonstrate to the Lebanese the cost of Hizballah's adventures. And both times, to bring about an enduring cease-fire, we needed to deal with Syria. This time, however, the cease-fire deal was done without the Syrians. Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 will depend to a large degree on the Syrians - unless, of course, the new international force deployed with the Lebanese army can both prevent resupply to Hizballah and bolster Lebanon's military so it can fulfill the role envisioned for it in the resolution. The more determined Syria is to frustrate implementation of the resolution, the more the international force will need a capability and a mandate to be aggressive in stopping efforts to get arms to Hizballah and in preventing its restoration as a fighting force. Will the international force have intensive inspection capability? Will it be deployed along all routes into Lebanon from Syria and be able to inspect all relevant vehicular traffic? Will it set up checkpoints on north-south access routes in Lebanon to do the same? There is every reason to believe the international force will not be able to accomplish such a mission anytime soon. Working in tandem, the Bush administration and the French should try to change the Syrian calculus. We should create a one-two punch with the French to make clear that Syria has something significant to lose by not cutting off Hizballah, and that it has something meaningful to gain from changing course. The Europeans currently provide a critical economic lifeline to the Syrians. Assad must see that Syria will pay an unmistakable price if it tries to block implementation of Resolution 1701. That price could be a joint French-EU and American effort to isolate Syria economically if it is unwilling to end its material support for Hizballah. 2006-08-17 01:00:00Full Article
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