Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Ha'aretz) Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion - The early years of the nuclear agreement with Iran are good ones, in which Iran reduces its stockpile of enriched uranium and enrichment equipment, and slows its industrial production of these components in a manner far more effective than any other means of achieving these goals. But in the following years, Iran will be able to legitimately build large-scale nuclear capabilities that would enable it to realize a military nuclear option within a relatively short time of deciding to do so. Thus, over the long term, the achievements of the "good years" appear in a less positive light. The value of the nuclear agreement and its long-term significance will depend primarily on how the "good years" are used to prepare for the following years. Israel should seek to build an international intelligence-alert system against regional nuclearization; to build up its capabilities for both covert and military action that might be needed in the future; to prepare for scenarios of either continuity (observance of the agreement) or disruption (its violation or collapse); to shore up its strategic relationships and mutual understandings with its most important ally as well as with its regional partners; and to create more convenient diplomatic and security conditions. The writer, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, served as head of Strategic Planning in the Planning Directorate in the IDF General Staff (2010-2015). 2016-08-19 00:00:00Full Article
Iran: Improving Our Capabilities for What Comes Next
(Ha'aretz) Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion - The early years of the nuclear agreement with Iran are good ones, in which Iran reduces its stockpile of enriched uranium and enrichment equipment, and slows its industrial production of these components in a manner far more effective than any other means of achieving these goals. But in the following years, Iran will be able to legitimately build large-scale nuclear capabilities that would enable it to realize a military nuclear option within a relatively short time of deciding to do so. Thus, over the long term, the achievements of the "good years" appear in a less positive light. The value of the nuclear agreement and its long-term significance will depend primarily on how the "good years" are used to prepare for the following years. Israel should seek to build an international intelligence-alert system against regional nuclearization; to build up its capabilities for both covert and military action that might be needed in the future; to prepare for scenarios of either continuity (observance of the agreement) or disruption (its violation or collapse); to shore up its strategic relationships and mutual understandings with its most important ally as well as with its regional partners; and to create more convenient diplomatic and security conditions. The writer, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, served as head of Strategic Planning in the Planning Directorate in the IDF General Staff (2010-2015). 2016-08-19 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|