Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Olli Heinonen - Nuclear weapons development usually goes hand-in-hand with the development of means of warhead delivery. This was one of the reasons that the 2010 UN Security Council resolution on Iran's nuclear program banned work on ballistic missiles. More recently, Resolution 2231 - passed in July 2015 to codify the nuclear deal - calls on Iran not to undertake ballistic missile-related activities until the IAEA concludes that Tehran's nuclear program is peaceful. Iran argues that its missile tests are permitted because Resolution 2231 only "call[s] upon" it "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Iran's testing of more advanced centrifuges, stockpiling of uranium, and enhancing nuclear manufacturing infrastructure continue apace. Developments in Tehran's missile program, therefore, cannot be dealt with in isolation from its nuclear efforts. If testing of ballistic and cruise missiles is not covered by Resolution 2231, the Security Council should issue a new resolution explicitly banning them. Failure to address this problem means that Iran will have delivery vehicles on hand when it is able, in a decade, to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb within a few weeks. The writer is former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of its Department of Safeguards.2017-02-09 00:00:00Full Article
Iran's Missile Tests Reveal Weaknesses of UN Security Council Resolution
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Olli Heinonen - Nuclear weapons development usually goes hand-in-hand with the development of means of warhead delivery. This was one of the reasons that the 2010 UN Security Council resolution on Iran's nuclear program banned work on ballistic missiles. More recently, Resolution 2231 - passed in July 2015 to codify the nuclear deal - calls on Iran not to undertake ballistic missile-related activities until the IAEA concludes that Tehran's nuclear program is peaceful. Iran argues that its missile tests are permitted because Resolution 2231 only "call[s] upon" it "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Iran's testing of more advanced centrifuges, stockpiling of uranium, and enhancing nuclear manufacturing infrastructure continue apace. Developments in Tehran's missile program, therefore, cannot be dealt with in isolation from its nuclear efforts. If testing of ballistic and cruise missiles is not covered by Resolution 2231, the Security Council should issue a new resolution explicitly banning them. Failure to address this problem means that Iran will have delivery vehicles on hand when it is able, in a decade, to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb within a few weeks. The writer is former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of its Department of Safeguards.2017-02-09 00:00:00Full Article
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