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(Middle East Quarterly) Emily B. Landau - To former President Obama, the Iran deal is a shining nonproliferation success story. But his assessment is wrong. The JCPOA has many flaws and weaknesses. Up until 2013, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) had sought to dismantle Iran's nuclear infrastructure - except perhaps for an extremely limited and mainly symbolic enrichment program - and to deny it the ability to develop nuclear weapons. However, by 2014, the P5+1 had deemed this goal unattainable and settled instead for a much watered-down aim: merely lengthening Tehran's breakout time from several months to a year while leaving much of its nuclear infrastructure intact. Moreover, they agreed to lift the restrictions in 10-15 years regardless of any change in Iran's behavior. Concessions, such as agreeing not to discuss ballistic missiles, opened the door to further compromises. The red-lines regarding the dismantlement of Iran's nuclear infrastructure turned pink, and many disappeared altogether. This included the number of centrifuges left spinning (originally 1,500, then 4,000, finally 6,000). Furthermore, the centrifuges were not dismantled but rather mothballed; the Fordow facility was left running; R&D was enabled into a full range of advanced centrifuges; and the demand for inspections of suspicious activities "any place, any time" turned into a much longer and ambiguous process. The hard-gained leverage of the biting sanctions that brought the Iranians to the table was gradually squandered in a process where Washington projected greater eagerness for a deal than Tehran. Obama's only achievement lies in kicking the nuclear can down the road to future administrations. But he created a reality in which it will be far more difficult to stop Iran down that road. The JCPOA does not end Tehran's nuclear ambitions, nor has it lived up to the president's hope of ushering in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations. Dr. Emily B. Landau is director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.2017-03-14 00:00:00Full Article
Obama's Legacy, a Nuclear Iran?
(Middle East Quarterly) Emily B. Landau - To former President Obama, the Iran deal is a shining nonproliferation success story. But his assessment is wrong. The JCPOA has many flaws and weaknesses. Up until 2013, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) had sought to dismantle Iran's nuclear infrastructure - except perhaps for an extremely limited and mainly symbolic enrichment program - and to deny it the ability to develop nuclear weapons. However, by 2014, the P5+1 had deemed this goal unattainable and settled instead for a much watered-down aim: merely lengthening Tehran's breakout time from several months to a year while leaving much of its nuclear infrastructure intact. Moreover, they agreed to lift the restrictions in 10-15 years regardless of any change in Iran's behavior. Concessions, such as agreeing not to discuss ballistic missiles, opened the door to further compromises. The red-lines regarding the dismantlement of Iran's nuclear infrastructure turned pink, and many disappeared altogether. This included the number of centrifuges left spinning (originally 1,500, then 4,000, finally 6,000). Furthermore, the centrifuges were not dismantled but rather mothballed; the Fordow facility was left running; R&D was enabled into a full range of advanced centrifuges; and the demand for inspections of suspicious activities "any place, any time" turned into a much longer and ambiguous process. The hard-gained leverage of the biting sanctions that brought the Iranians to the table was gradually squandered in a process where Washington projected greater eagerness for a deal than Tehran. Obama's only achievement lies in kicking the nuclear can down the road to future administrations. But he created a reality in which it will be far more difficult to stop Iran down that road. The JCPOA does not end Tehran's nuclear ambitions, nor has it lived up to the president's hope of ushering in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations. Dr. Emily B. Landau is director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.2017-03-14 00:00:00Full Article
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