Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Jerusalem Post) Gal Perl Finkel - In an article he wrote in 2014, retired U.S. general Daniel Bolger, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, admitted (with uncommon integrity) that the U.S. "didn't understand our own forces, which are built for rapid, decisive conventional operations, not lingering, ill-defined counterinsurgencies. We're made for Desert Storm, not Vietnam." According to Bolger, the Surge strategy "in Iraq did not 'win' anything. It bought time. It allowed us to kill some more bad guys and feel better about ourselves." Retired colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, a decorated combat veteran, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that in order "to terminate future conflicts on terms that favor the United States and avoid long, destructive wars of attrition, the U.S. armed forces must combine the concentration of massive firepower across service lines with the near-simultaneous attack of ground maneuver forces in time and space to achieve decisive effects against opposing forces." That statement sounded like it was taken from the IDF strategy published by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot in 2015. The writer is coordinator of the Military and Strategic Affairs program at the Institute for National Security Studies. 2017-03-22 00:00:00Full Article
U.S. and Israeli Anti-Terrorist Strategies
(Jerusalem Post) Gal Perl Finkel - In an article he wrote in 2014, retired U.S. general Daniel Bolger, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, admitted (with uncommon integrity) that the U.S. "didn't understand our own forces, which are built for rapid, decisive conventional operations, not lingering, ill-defined counterinsurgencies. We're made for Desert Storm, not Vietnam." According to Bolger, the Surge strategy "in Iraq did not 'win' anything. It bought time. It allowed us to kill some more bad guys and feel better about ourselves." Retired colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, a decorated combat veteran, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that in order "to terminate future conflicts on terms that favor the United States and avoid long, destructive wars of attrition, the U.S. armed forces must combine the concentration of massive firepower across service lines with the near-simultaneous attack of ground maneuver forces in time and space to achieve decisive effects against opposing forces." That statement sounded like it was taken from the IDF strategy published by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot in 2015. The writer is coordinator of the Military and Strategic Affairs program at the Institute for National Security Studies. 2017-03-22 00:00:00Full Article
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