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(Atlantic) Aaron David Miller - The 1967 war generated opportunities and a new, more pragmatic dynamic among the Arab states and Palestinians, which at least partially reversed the results of the war itself and transformed much of the Arab-Israeli arena. With this in mind, here are some myths about the war's centrality and impact that need to be reexamined. "The 1967 war was the most consequential and impactful of the conflicts between Israel and the Arabs." The 1948 conflict was more foundational, creating as it did the state of Israel, the Palestinian refugee problem, and a political revolution in Arab politics that would see various coups and revolutions. "There were very real and missed opportunities for Arab-Israeli agreements in the wake of the war." Not really. There was a flurry of initiatives, statements, and U.S. and Russian maneuvering during the postwar period. And in November 1967, UN Security Council Resolution 242 established the guiding principles for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. From my personal experience, I can attest that diplomats and would-be peacemakers often imagined openings and opportunities where there were none. "The 1967 war was an unmitigated disaster for the Palestinians." The war would carry an unintended set of consequences that would redefine the Palestinian national movement. The discrediting of the Arab states, particularly the bankruptcy of Arab nationalism, would force Palestinians to strike out on their own. The Arab defeat reenergized Palestinian identity and put Palestinians on the political map. "The 1967 war was a catastrophe for peacemaking." Not really. In strategic terms, the 1967 war created one new reality that could not be denied: Arab state weakness and the rapidly fading prospect of destroying Israel by force, even in phases. The growing alignment between Israel and the Sunni states, particularly in the Gulf, attests to a new pragmatism born of a common threat perception of a rising Iran and Sunni jihadis, and sheer Arab state fatigue with the Palestinian issue. "Fifty years later, Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians are ready to solve the conflict." Don't bet on it. The core of the impasse is a reality that shows no signs of changing: the gaps on the core issues-1967 borders, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state-are Grand Canyon-like. Without their narrowing, no matter how the new peace process starts, it is hard to imagine it ending well. 2017-06-06 00:00:00Full Article
Five Myths about 1967 that Just Won't Die
(Atlantic) Aaron David Miller - The 1967 war generated opportunities and a new, more pragmatic dynamic among the Arab states and Palestinians, which at least partially reversed the results of the war itself and transformed much of the Arab-Israeli arena. With this in mind, here are some myths about the war's centrality and impact that need to be reexamined. "The 1967 war was the most consequential and impactful of the conflicts between Israel and the Arabs." The 1948 conflict was more foundational, creating as it did the state of Israel, the Palestinian refugee problem, and a political revolution in Arab politics that would see various coups and revolutions. "There were very real and missed opportunities for Arab-Israeli agreements in the wake of the war." Not really. There was a flurry of initiatives, statements, and U.S. and Russian maneuvering during the postwar period. And in November 1967, UN Security Council Resolution 242 established the guiding principles for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. From my personal experience, I can attest that diplomats and would-be peacemakers often imagined openings and opportunities where there were none. "The 1967 war was an unmitigated disaster for the Palestinians." The war would carry an unintended set of consequences that would redefine the Palestinian national movement. The discrediting of the Arab states, particularly the bankruptcy of Arab nationalism, would force Palestinians to strike out on their own. The Arab defeat reenergized Palestinian identity and put Palestinians on the political map. "The 1967 war was a catastrophe for peacemaking." Not really. In strategic terms, the 1967 war created one new reality that could not be denied: Arab state weakness and the rapidly fading prospect of destroying Israel by force, even in phases. The growing alignment between Israel and the Sunni states, particularly in the Gulf, attests to a new pragmatism born of a common threat perception of a rising Iran and Sunni jihadis, and sheer Arab state fatigue with the Palestinian issue. "Fifty years later, Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians are ready to solve the conflict." Don't bet on it. The core of the impasse is a reality that shows no signs of changing: the gaps on the core issues-1967 borders, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state-are Grand Canyon-like. Without their narrowing, no matter how the new peace process starts, it is hard to imagine it ending well. 2017-06-06 00:00:00Full Article
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