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(MEMRI) Yigal Carmon and A. Savyon - The main, critical problem in the Iran nuclear agreement, which requires immediate attention, is its lack of real inspection. Recently it was reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had chosen to refrain from inspecting sites in Iran based on information submitted to it about possible violations. When Iran, the IAEA, and the heads of the parties to the JCPOA reiterate that there is robust, intrusive, and unprecedented inspection, they are perpetuating the false depiction of the section of the JCPOA concerning inspection. This is because the inspection procedure takes place only at sites where Iran has agreed to allow inspection, that is, sites Iran itself has declared as nuclear sites, but not at any other sites in Iran, including military sites. Carrying out inspections in the other sites can take place only after political negotiations in the Joint Commission of the JCPOA - which comprises the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Russia, China, the IAEA, and Iran - and only after 30 days have passed from the time of the submission of the intelligence information that prompted the request for inspection, and only after the sources of this intelligence have been fully revealed to Iran, Russia, and China. Under these conditions, there is no possibility of real and effective inspection of Iran's nuclear activity. On Sep. 18, 2017, President Trump, via U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry, notified the IAEA General Conference that "we will not accept a weakly enforced or inadequately monitored deal." With this statement, Trump has set an actual condition for the continuation of U.S. support for the JCPOA. This demand for robust oversight is not a demand for a change in the JCPOA, nor does it mean an exit from it, but rather it is based on acceptance of the agreement and on the insistence that it be rigorously enforced as it stands. IDF Col. (ret.) Yigal Carmon, former counter-terrorism advisor to two Israeli prime ministers, is President of MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iranian Media Project.2017-10-04 00:00:00Full Article
The Iran Deal's Critical Flaw Is Its Lack of Real Inspection by the IAEA
(MEMRI) Yigal Carmon and A. Savyon - The main, critical problem in the Iran nuclear agreement, which requires immediate attention, is its lack of real inspection. Recently it was reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had chosen to refrain from inspecting sites in Iran based on information submitted to it about possible violations. When Iran, the IAEA, and the heads of the parties to the JCPOA reiterate that there is robust, intrusive, and unprecedented inspection, they are perpetuating the false depiction of the section of the JCPOA concerning inspection. This is because the inspection procedure takes place only at sites where Iran has agreed to allow inspection, that is, sites Iran itself has declared as nuclear sites, but not at any other sites in Iran, including military sites. Carrying out inspections in the other sites can take place only after political negotiations in the Joint Commission of the JCPOA - which comprises the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Russia, China, the IAEA, and Iran - and only after 30 days have passed from the time of the submission of the intelligence information that prompted the request for inspection, and only after the sources of this intelligence have been fully revealed to Iran, Russia, and China. Under these conditions, there is no possibility of real and effective inspection of Iran's nuclear activity. On Sep. 18, 2017, President Trump, via U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry, notified the IAEA General Conference that "we will not accept a weakly enforced or inadequately monitored deal." With this statement, Trump has set an actual condition for the continuation of U.S. support for the JCPOA. This demand for robust oversight is not a demand for a change in the JCPOA, nor does it mean an exit from it, but rather it is based on acceptance of the agreement and on the insistence that it be rigorously enforced as it stands. IDF Col. (ret.) Yigal Carmon, former counter-terrorism advisor to two Israeli prime ministers, is President of MEMRI; A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iranian Media Project.2017-10-04 00:00:00Full Article
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