Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
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- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
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- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
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- Jennifer Rubin
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- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
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- Michael Young
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Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
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- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
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- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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[International Herald Tribune] Roger Stern - In a war game in 2002, Lt.-Gen. Paul Van Riper of the Marines was called from retirement to lead a surrogate Iranian force defending against a U.S. attack. The general was recruited for his special talent, devising creative ways to fight stronger, technologically superior opponents. Using motorbike messengers to keep his communications secure from high-tech eavesdropping, he launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Navy from a fleet of small, fast missile boats. The barrage was intended to saturate U.S. anti-missile radars, allowing at least a few missiles to reach their targets. This worked perfectly. A U.S. aircraft carrier and 15 other warships went to the bottom. Iranian naval doctrine is to strike hard, once, before being destroyed. To deliver this strike, Iran's Revolutionary Guards began building a fleet like Van Riper's long before the general showed what damage it could do. Anti-ship missiles have been sinking real warships in combat since 1982, when an Argentine fighter pilot fired just two at HMS Sheffield. Deeply unpopular, the Iranian regime now relies on constantly rising oil prices for survival. An oil price decline would be a mortal threat. If Bush wants to hit the regime where it hurts, conciliation should become his byword. In the price collapse that would follow, he'd find a brand new Iranian appetite for negotiation. This is because, unlike sanctions that might take years to bite, a peace initiative would threaten the mullahs tomorrow. The writer Roger Stern is a national security and energy policy analyst in the Oil, Energy and the Middle East Program at Princeton University. 2008-01-11 01:00:00Full Article
U.S. Can Beat Iran - But Not by Fighting
[International Herald Tribune] Roger Stern - In a war game in 2002, Lt.-Gen. Paul Van Riper of the Marines was called from retirement to lead a surrogate Iranian force defending against a U.S. attack. The general was recruited for his special talent, devising creative ways to fight stronger, technologically superior opponents. Using motorbike messengers to keep his communications secure from high-tech eavesdropping, he launched a surprise attack on the U.S. Navy from a fleet of small, fast missile boats. The barrage was intended to saturate U.S. anti-missile radars, allowing at least a few missiles to reach their targets. This worked perfectly. A U.S. aircraft carrier and 15 other warships went to the bottom. Iranian naval doctrine is to strike hard, once, before being destroyed. To deliver this strike, Iran's Revolutionary Guards began building a fleet like Van Riper's long before the general showed what damage it could do. Anti-ship missiles have been sinking real warships in combat since 1982, when an Argentine fighter pilot fired just two at HMS Sheffield. Deeply unpopular, the Iranian regime now relies on constantly rising oil prices for survival. An oil price decline would be a mortal threat. If Bush wants to hit the regime where it hurts, conciliation should become his byword. In the price collapse that would follow, he'd find a brand new Iranian appetite for negotiation. This is because, unlike sanctions that might take years to bite, a peace initiative would threaten the mullahs tomorrow. The writer Roger Stern is a national security and energy policy analyst in the Oil, Energy and the Middle East Program at Princeton University. 2008-01-11 01:00:00Full Article
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