Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Jerusalem Post) Hillel Frisch - How well did Hamas create and spread violence and Israelis avoid or quell it in the "March of Return" campaign? The score sheet is heavily set against Hamas. The campaign failed to ignite the Arab residents of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which was relatively quiet. While in the past, during the first intifada (1987-93), the Israeli public was sharply divided, the "March of Return" aimed at returning Palestinians to Ashkelon, Beersheba and Jaffa had the opposite effect, as Israelis united behind the IDF's tough policy of zero-tolerance for breaching the border fence. If the number of dead and wounded is anywhere near true (the figures are probably exaggerated), not only will the vast majority of Gazans who did not get anywhere near the fence question such bloodshed in the face of the fact that it changed nothing, but also those who participated probably have second thoughts as well. The writer, a professor of political and Middle East studies at Bar-Ilan University, is a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.2018-05-25 00:00:00Full Article
Score Sheet on Hamas' "March of Return" Campaign
(Jerusalem Post) Hillel Frisch - How well did Hamas create and spread violence and Israelis avoid or quell it in the "March of Return" campaign? The score sheet is heavily set against Hamas. The campaign failed to ignite the Arab residents of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, which was relatively quiet. While in the past, during the first intifada (1987-93), the Israeli public was sharply divided, the "March of Return" aimed at returning Palestinians to Ashkelon, Beersheba and Jaffa had the opposite effect, as Israelis united behind the IDF's tough policy of zero-tolerance for breaching the border fence. If the number of dead and wounded is anywhere near true (the figures are probably exaggerated), not only will the vast majority of Gazans who did not get anywhere near the fence question such bloodshed in the face of the fact that it changed nothing, but also those who participated probably have second thoughts as well. The writer, a professor of political and Middle East studies at Bar-Ilan University, is a senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.2018-05-25 00:00:00Full Article
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