Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Fathom-BICOM-UK) Col. (ret.) Joel Singer - The main error of Rabin and Peres in deciding to enter into the Oslo Agreement with Arafat in the early 1990s was that they were misled to believe that Arafat had changed from being a terrorist. Rabin and Peres had concluded that if Arafat was strong enough to prevent anyone else from making a deal with Israel, then he surely must be the only one capable of making such a deal. The messages that Arafat sent to Israel in Oslo conveyed that he was prepared to make a historic deal. For these reasons, Arafat was perceived by Rabin and Peres as the ideal negotiating partner, a hawkish leader who, when circumstances changed, would be prepared to rise to the occasion and enforce his decisions against any opposition. But, when Hamas and other terrorist organizations started killing Israelis, Arafat proved himself to be unable and unwilling to stop terrorism. Moreover, when the negotiating parties reached the important issues, Arafat constantly sought internal Palestinian consensus, which required the agreement of Hamas, whose main objective continued to be the destruction of Israel. Arafat's heir, Mahmoud Abbas, while perhaps a bit more willing, is even less capable of making the kind of historic decisions that are required to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. No wonder that the Oslo-based peace process has all but come to a standstill. The most important accomplishment of Oslo is the existence of an autonomous Palestinian leadership in the West Bank that is handling most of the daily affairs of most of the Palestinians. They are building strong security forces that, at least in the West Bank, are cooperating quite successfully with Israeli forces. Oslo enables the two parties to keep building their relations even before they have resolved their most fundamental disagreements. The writer, former head of the International Law Department of the IDF and legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, was the Israeli delegation's legal adviser to the Oslo talks, involved in negotiating all the Oslo implementing agreements. 2018-08-31 00:00:00Full Article
Errors and Successes of the Oslo Agreement
(Fathom-BICOM-UK) Col. (ret.) Joel Singer - The main error of Rabin and Peres in deciding to enter into the Oslo Agreement with Arafat in the early 1990s was that they were misled to believe that Arafat had changed from being a terrorist. Rabin and Peres had concluded that if Arafat was strong enough to prevent anyone else from making a deal with Israel, then he surely must be the only one capable of making such a deal. The messages that Arafat sent to Israel in Oslo conveyed that he was prepared to make a historic deal. For these reasons, Arafat was perceived by Rabin and Peres as the ideal negotiating partner, a hawkish leader who, when circumstances changed, would be prepared to rise to the occasion and enforce his decisions against any opposition. But, when Hamas and other terrorist organizations started killing Israelis, Arafat proved himself to be unable and unwilling to stop terrorism. Moreover, when the negotiating parties reached the important issues, Arafat constantly sought internal Palestinian consensus, which required the agreement of Hamas, whose main objective continued to be the destruction of Israel. Arafat's heir, Mahmoud Abbas, while perhaps a bit more willing, is even less capable of making the kind of historic decisions that are required to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. No wonder that the Oslo-based peace process has all but come to a standstill. The most important accomplishment of Oslo is the existence of an autonomous Palestinian leadership in the West Bank that is handling most of the daily affairs of most of the Palestinians. They are building strong security forces that, at least in the West Bank, are cooperating quite successfully with Israeli forces. Oslo enables the two parties to keep building their relations even before they have resolved their most fundamental disagreements. The writer, former head of the International Law Department of the IDF and legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, was the Israeli delegation's legal adviser to the Oslo talks, involved in negotiating all the Oslo implementing agreements. 2018-08-31 00:00:00Full Article
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