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(The Strategy Bridge) Christian H. Heller - In 1948, the nascent Israeli state won an authoritative military victory which laid the groundwork for its success in future wars of survival. Israel's national strategy in 1948 revolved around mitigating three strategic deficits. First, the Yishuv - or Jewish community in Palestine - lacked a professional military capable of defending its sovereignty against the Arab armies. Second, despite rapid immigration after World War II, Israel's population was a fraction of the size of its combined Arab opponents. Finally, Israel's lack of geographic space in which to maneuver its forces minimized its military options. Israel's ability to build and employ an army, divide its enemies to exploit their weaknesses, and create artificial space in which to operate demonstrates how to overcome strategic deficits and attain victory with strong military institutions and a cohesive national strategy. The Palestinian Arabs in 1948 had no trained military forces; the local militias had no weapons suppliers; and the population was without leadership. Despite sharing the same language, religion, and history, deep internal divisions divided the Palestinian factions. In contrast, the Yishuv was united politically, motivated to fight, and led by centralized para-state institutions, the most important of which were its militias. Israel was able to field a numerically superior army to the Arab states despite its population disadvantage, and 35,000 Israel Defense Forces soldiers faced off against 25,000 Arabs in May 1948. By July, the IDF numbered 65,000. It would ultimately deploy over 100,000 men and women, and mobilized its small population by emphasizing the existential threat it faced. The possibility for co-existence or negotiations with the Arabs seemed remote after Arab leaders made blatant declarations about their intentions to destroy Israel. Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, proclaimed, "This will be a war of extermination, a momentous massacre." Hassan al-Banna, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated, "All Arabs shall arise and annihilate the Jews. We shall fill the sea with their corpses." The writer is a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Officer and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. 2018-09-28 00:00:00Full Article
Overcoming Strategic Deficits in the 1948 Israeli War for Independence
(The Strategy Bridge) Christian H. Heller - In 1948, the nascent Israeli state won an authoritative military victory which laid the groundwork for its success in future wars of survival. Israel's national strategy in 1948 revolved around mitigating three strategic deficits. First, the Yishuv - or Jewish community in Palestine - lacked a professional military capable of defending its sovereignty against the Arab armies. Second, despite rapid immigration after World War II, Israel's population was a fraction of the size of its combined Arab opponents. Finally, Israel's lack of geographic space in which to maneuver its forces minimized its military options. Israel's ability to build and employ an army, divide its enemies to exploit their weaknesses, and create artificial space in which to operate demonstrates how to overcome strategic deficits and attain victory with strong military institutions and a cohesive national strategy. The Palestinian Arabs in 1948 had no trained military forces; the local militias had no weapons suppliers; and the population was without leadership. Despite sharing the same language, religion, and history, deep internal divisions divided the Palestinian factions. In contrast, the Yishuv was united politically, motivated to fight, and led by centralized para-state institutions, the most important of which were its militias. Israel was able to field a numerically superior army to the Arab states despite its population disadvantage, and 35,000 Israel Defense Forces soldiers faced off against 25,000 Arabs in May 1948. By July, the IDF numbered 65,000. It would ultimately deploy over 100,000 men and women, and mobilized its small population by emphasizing the existential threat it faced. The possibility for co-existence or negotiations with the Arabs seemed remote after Arab leaders made blatant declarations about their intentions to destroy Israel. Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, proclaimed, "This will be a war of extermination, a momentous massacre." Hassan al-Banna, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated, "All Arabs shall arise and annihilate the Jews. We shall fill the sea with their corpses." The writer is a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Officer and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. 2018-09-28 00:00:00Full Article
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