Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Emily B. Landau - The specific violations of the nuclear deal that Iran has chosen to commit expose dangerous flaws in the JCPOA that were apparent from the start. Iran would not be able to hike up its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU), or enrich to higher levels, if enrichment had not been allowed and even legitimized by the deal. Moreover, Iran was allowed under the deal to work on research and development on a full range of advanced centrifuges, meaning that a decision to operate them was only a short step away. The heavily fortified underground enrichment facility at Fordow, now restarting operations, should not have been allowed to remain open. This facility, which was not declared to the IAEA and had been meant to be kept secret, was revealed in 2009 on the basis of intelligence information. Having been caught red-handed regarding an undeclared facility, demonstrating that Iran was deceiving the IAEA regarding a facility with military applications, it made sense to demand that it be shut down. Not only was Fordow left open, but 1,000 centrifuges were left in the facility. The latest IAEA report on Iran fails to mention anything about its investigation into the Iran nuclear archives - the original Iranian documents detailing its plans for producing five nuclear bombs that Israel extracted from Tehran in January 2018. These documents - which include information about scientists, facilities, and equipment involved in Iran's military nuclear program that were not known in 2015 - were turned over to the IAEA over a year and a half ago. It is preferable to confront Iran's violations now, when it is relatively weak, than in 5-10 years when the deal expired and the country could achieve a quick nuclear breakout. The writer heads the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at INSS.2019-11-26 00:00:00Full Article
Confront Iran's Nuclear Violations
(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Emily B. Landau - The specific violations of the nuclear deal that Iran has chosen to commit expose dangerous flaws in the JCPOA that were apparent from the start. Iran would not be able to hike up its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU), or enrich to higher levels, if enrichment had not been allowed and even legitimized by the deal. Moreover, Iran was allowed under the deal to work on research and development on a full range of advanced centrifuges, meaning that a decision to operate them was only a short step away. The heavily fortified underground enrichment facility at Fordow, now restarting operations, should not have been allowed to remain open. This facility, which was not declared to the IAEA and had been meant to be kept secret, was revealed in 2009 on the basis of intelligence information. Having been caught red-handed regarding an undeclared facility, demonstrating that Iran was deceiving the IAEA regarding a facility with military applications, it made sense to demand that it be shut down. Not only was Fordow left open, but 1,000 centrifuges were left in the facility. The latest IAEA report on Iran fails to mention anything about its investigation into the Iran nuclear archives - the original Iranian documents detailing its plans for producing five nuclear bombs that Israel extracted from Tehran in January 2018. These documents - which include information about scientists, facilities, and equipment involved in Iran's military nuclear program that were not known in 2015 - were turned over to the IAEA over a year and a half ago. It is preferable to confront Iran's violations now, when it is relatively weak, than in 5-10 years when the deal expired and the country could achieve a quick nuclear breakout. The writer heads the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at INSS.2019-11-26 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|