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(Ha'aretz) Yossi Melman - On Oct. 13, 1973, an Egyptian army officer working for Israeli intelligence transmitted a report that enabled the Israel Defense Forces to repulse a major Egyptian attack in Sinai and to prevent Israel's defeat in the Yom Kippur War. According to the report, the next day (Oct. 14) the Egyptian army would launch a massive new attack in order to advance its forces along the entire length of the front, beyond the line of the Sinai passes (Gidi and Mitla), in order to capture additional territory and to destroy as many IDF forces as possible. Based on this information, the IDF prepared in time, waited for the attack and then crushed a large part of the Egyptian force. On Oct. 14, the second largest tank battle in history was fought, with the participation of 1,500 tanks from both sides. The IDF repulsed the attack and the Egyptian Army lost 250 tanks in a single day. The success of the operation paved the way to the Israeli counterattack that led to the crossing of the Suez Canal and the end of the war. 2020-10-15 00:00:00Full Article
The Egyptian Spy that Saved Israel in 1973
(Ha'aretz) Yossi Melman - On Oct. 13, 1973, an Egyptian army officer working for Israeli intelligence transmitted a report that enabled the Israel Defense Forces to repulse a major Egyptian attack in Sinai and to prevent Israel's defeat in the Yom Kippur War. According to the report, the next day (Oct. 14) the Egyptian army would launch a massive new attack in order to advance its forces along the entire length of the front, beyond the line of the Sinai passes (Gidi and Mitla), in order to capture additional territory and to destroy as many IDF forces as possible. Based on this information, the IDF prepared in time, waited for the attack and then crushed a large part of the Egyptian force. On Oct. 14, the second largest tank battle in history was fought, with the participation of 1,500 tanks from both sides. The IDF repulsed the attack and the Egyptian Army lost 250 tanks in a single day. The success of the operation paved the way to the Israeli counterattack that led to the crossing of the Suez Canal and the end of the war. 2020-10-15 00:00:00Full Article
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