Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Foreign Affairs) Dennis Ross - U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has a strong desire to put Iran's nuclear program back in the box and to avoid choosing from an unappealing list of options for preventing Tehran from enriching uranium to near weapons grade and shrinking its "breakout" time to close to zero. Clearly, if there is no deal, or if Iran begins to ramp up its nuclear program as part of its negotiating strategy, the U.S. will need a better strategy for deterring Tehran. But even if the two sides reach an agreement, the Biden administration will need to improve its deterrence. Key provisions of the 2015 deal will "sunset" in 2030, leaving Iran without limits on the size of its nuclear infrastructure, the number or quality of its centrifuges, or the level of its enrichment. To improve U.S. deterrence in the long run, the aim must be to restore Iran's fear of U.S. military action. Iran's leaders must know that by pressing ahead they will risk losing their entire nuclear infrastructure, which has taken them several decades to develop. Washington must put Iran on notice that it will respond with all appropriate means if it detects movement toward a nuclear weapon. Instead of saying "all options are on the table" - a statement that no one takes seriously - the Biden administration should say that if Iran moves toward a weapon, it will jeopardize its entire nuclear infrastructure. To make its declaratory policy credible, the Biden administration should instruct the U.S. Central Command to conduct exercises to rehearse air-to-ground attacks on hardened targets. It should also run exercises in which it refuels Israeli aircraft. What it should not do is what it did in May: deny that it refueled Israeli aircraft during a joint exercise. Washington needs to stoke Iranian fears of an attack, not give the country's leaders reason to doubt it would ever act militarily against them. Finally, the U.S. must be prepared to respond more forcefully to attacks by Iranian proxies on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Bases where U.S. forces are stationed have been targeted more than 40 times, but the U.S. has responded in a highly calibrated way only twice. Washington's responses must be unexpected, and they must signal to Iranian leaders that the U.S. is willing to use force against them. The U.S. must make clear that it is no longer willing to tolerate these attacks. Ironically, restoring Iran's fear of the U.S. may be the only way to avoid a war, limit Iranian threats in the region, and produce an acceptable diplomatic outcome on the character of the Iranian nuclear program. The writer, who served in senior national security positions in four U.S. administrations, is the Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.2022-07-07 00:00:00Full Article
The U.S. Needs a Better Strategy to Deter Iran
(Foreign Affairs) Dennis Ross - U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has a strong desire to put Iran's nuclear program back in the box and to avoid choosing from an unappealing list of options for preventing Tehran from enriching uranium to near weapons grade and shrinking its "breakout" time to close to zero. Clearly, if there is no deal, or if Iran begins to ramp up its nuclear program as part of its negotiating strategy, the U.S. will need a better strategy for deterring Tehran. But even if the two sides reach an agreement, the Biden administration will need to improve its deterrence. Key provisions of the 2015 deal will "sunset" in 2030, leaving Iran without limits on the size of its nuclear infrastructure, the number or quality of its centrifuges, or the level of its enrichment. To improve U.S. deterrence in the long run, the aim must be to restore Iran's fear of U.S. military action. Iran's leaders must know that by pressing ahead they will risk losing their entire nuclear infrastructure, which has taken them several decades to develop. Washington must put Iran on notice that it will respond with all appropriate means if it detects movement toward a nuclear weapon. Instead of saying "all options are on the table" - a statement that no one takes seriously - the Biden administration should say that if Iran moves toward a weapon, it will jeopardize its entire nuclear infrastructure. To make its declaratory policy credible, the Biden administration should instruct the U.S. Central Command to conduct exercises to rehearse air-to-ground attacks on hardened targets. It should also run exercises in which it refuels Israeli aircraft. What it should not do is what it did in May: deny that it refueled Israeli aircraft during a joint exercise. Washington needs to stoke Iranian fears of an attack, not give the country's leaders reason to doubt it would ever act militarily against them. Finally, the U.S. must be prepared to respond more forcefully to attacks by Iranian proxies on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Bases where U.S. forces are stationed have been targeted more than 40 times, but the U.S. has responded in a highly calibrated way only twice. Washington's responses must be unexpected, and they must signal to Iranian leaders that the U.S. is willing to use force against them. The U.S. must make clear that it is no longer willing to tolerate these attacks. Ironically, restoring Iran's fear of the U.S. may be the only way to avoid a war, limit Iranian threats in the region, and produce an acceptable diplomatic outcome on the character of the Iranian nuclear program. The writer, who served in senior national security positions in four U.S. administrations, is the Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.2022-07-07 00:00:00Full Article
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