Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Wall Street Journal) David Schenker - I visited Beirut in 2020 while serving as assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs to restart the maritime border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon that had been stalled for nearly a decade. Two years later, the states have reached an agreement on their offshore exclusive economic zone boundary that heavily favors Lebanon. During negotiations, mediated by the Biden administration, Israel conceded the entirety of its claims to the 330-square-mile zone to Lebanon in return for a 3-mile internationally recognized buffer zone adjacent to the shoreline. As per the new agreement, Lebanon will attain virtually 100% of its initial negotiating position. It's a remarkable turn of events, especially given Beirut's profound lack of leverage. Lebanese negotiators won the day by employing a time-tested bait-and-switch negotiating tactic. Immediately after talks commenced, Lebanon changed its position, demanding an even larger exclusive economic zone, a maximalist demand that led to a breakdown in the talks. When negotiations resumed, the new Israeli government saw Lebanon's readiness to return to the previous line as a significant concession. The Israel Defense Forces say the agreement will remove one point of friction with Hizbullah. But the proposition that the maritime deal makes Israel safer or promotes prospects for normalization with yet another Arab state is dubious. With Iran upgrading its proxy's arsenal of missiles and Hizbullah digging in along Israel's border, another war appears inevitable. It's difficult to imagine that Hizbullah won't emerge from these negotiations emboldened by Israel's decision. The compromises Israel made demonstrate how far it will go to make peace with its Arab neighbors. Unfortunately, as long as Beirut remains a satrapy of Iran and dominated by its proxy, it's unclear how any agreement will prevent the next Israel-Hizbullah war. The writer is director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2022-10-13 00:00:00Full Article
Lebanon's Bait-and-Switch Treaty
(Wall Street Journal) David Schenker - I visited Beirut in 2020 while serving as assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs to restart the maritime border negotiations between Israel and Lebanon that had been stalled for nearly a decade. Two years later, the states have reached an agreement on their offshore exclusive economic zone boundary that heavily favors Lebanon. During negotiations, mediated by the Biden administration, Israel conceded the entirety of its claims to the 330-square-mile zone to Lebanon in return for a 3-mile internationally recognized buffer zone adjacent to the shoreline. As per the new agreement, Lebanon will attain virtually 100% of its initial negotiating position. It's a remarkable turn of events, especially given Beirut's profound lack of leverage. Lebanese negotiators won the day by employing a time-tested bait-and-switch negotiating tactic. Immediately after talks commenced, Lebanon changed its position, demanding an even larger exclusive economic zone, a maximalist demand that led to a breakdown in the talks. When negotiations resumed, the new Israeli government saw Lebanon's readiness to return to the previous line as a significant concession. The Israel Defense Forces say the agreement will remove one point of friction with Hizbullah. But the proposition that the maritime deal makes Israel safer or promotes prospects for normalization with yet another Arab state is dubious. With Iran upgrading its proxy's arsenal of missiles and Hizbullah digging in along Israel's border, another war appears inevitable. It's difficult to imagine that Hizbullah won't emerge from these negotiations emboldened by Israel's decision. The compromises Israel made demonstrate how far it will go to make peace with its Arab neighbors. Unfortunately, as long as Beirut remains a satrapy of Iran and dominated by its proxy, it's unclear how any agreement will prevent the next Israel-Hizbullah war. The writer is director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2022-10-13 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|