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(Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies-Bar-Ilan University) Maj.-Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen - The audacity of the IDF leadership and Israel's war cabinet to deploy the IDF for an attack deep into Gaza's densely populated and fortified urban terrain, both above and below ground - with an intensity not seen before - must be recognized as an achievement of strategic significance. The political and military leadership clearly understood that they were heading into a prolonged war, and they declared this to be the case from the outset. However, the public is struggling to understand why this war needs to last longer than any other war since the War of Independence. The Israeli need to end wars quickly was clearly understood and effectively integrated into the perception of warfare developed by Hizbullah and Hamas, with the backing of Iran. They formulated a concept of warfare based on dense defensive lines containing obstacles and explosives, both above and below ground, in the heart of built-up areas in cities and villages. Under these conditions, a rapid advance into enemy territory becomes a very complex task. Moreover, in Gaza the enemy's military force is made up of local residents. When IDF forces penetrate deep into the territory, Hamas fighters, who are locals, can easily blend into the population, ready to reemerge when opportunity strikes. This is why operations to clear Gaza or to combat Hizbullah require extensive force deployment and prolonged durations. Another significant change is the jihadist religious consciousness that motivates the forces built up in the last decades to combat Israel. When the IDF faces Hamas and Hizbullah, it encounters Islamic fighters who are believers, presenting a challenge not previously recognized. The IDF has not weakened since June 1967, but Israel's enemies have changed. They have evolved creatively and are much stronger. Since 1967, the world of warfare has changed completely. The writer, a senior research fellow at the BESA Center, served in the IDF for 42 years, commanding troops in battles with Egypt and Syria.2024-01-07 00:00:00Full Article
Warfare Has Changed and the Israeli Security Concept Must Change with It
(Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies-Bar-Ilan University) Maj.-Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen - The audacity of the IDF leadership and Israel's war cabinet to deploy the IDF for an attack deep into Gaza's densely populated and fortified urban terrain, both above and below ground - with an intensity not seen before - must be recognized as an achievement of strategic significance. The political and military leadership clearly understood that they were heading into a prolonged war, and they declared this to be the case from the outset. However, the public is struggling to understand why this war needs to last longer than any other war since the War of Independence. The Israeli need to end wars quickly was clearly understood and effectively integrated into the perception of warfare developed by Hizbullah and Hamas, with the backing of Iran. They formulated a concept of warfare based on dense defensive lines containing obstacles and explosives, both above and below ground, in the heart of built-up areas in cities and villages. Under these conditions, a rapid advance into enemy territory becomes a very complex task. Moreover, in Gaza the enemy's military force is made up of local residents. When IDF forces penetrate deep into the territory, Hamas fighters, who are locals, can easily blend into the population, ready to reemerge when opportunity strikes. This is why operations to clear Gaza or to combat Hizbullah require extensive force deployment and prolonged durations. Another significant change is the jihadist religious consciousness that motivates the forces built up in the last decades to combat Israel. When the IDF faces Hamas and Hizbullah, it encounters Islamic fighters who are believers, presenting a challenge not previously recognized. The IDF has not weakened since June 1967, but Israel's enemies have changed. They have evolved creatively and are much stronger. Since 1967, the world of warfare has changed completely. The writer, a senior research fellow at the BESA Center, served in the IDF for 42 years, commanding troops in battles with Egypt and Syria.2024-01-07 00:00:00Full Article
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