Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Foreign Policy) Raphael S. Cohen - Since the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, a parade of U.S. defense officials have offered advice - largely unsolicited - about how Israel should conduct its offensive in Gaza, based on the lessons the U.S. learned from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are many reasons why Israel has so far chosen to ignore these recommendations. For starters, Iraq and Afghanistan were much larger and half a world away; Gaza is far smaller, more compact, and right next door to Israel. Then there is the fact that the U.S. lost the Afghanistan War and produced a muddled outcome in Iraq. Yet there is another important factor at play. The Israel Defense Forces' relationship with society, cultural predilections, and norms of behavior are unique. Fewer than 1% of Americans serve on active duty and all do so by choice. The IDF is at its core a draft military, designed to be what Israel's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, called a "people's army," both a reflection of society and the glue that binds the people together. On Oct. 7, the IDF failed not only to protect the Israeli public but it failed to protect its own: At least 274 Israeli soldiers, plus dozens of local security officials, were killed that day. Current and recently retired IDF officers often told me of the need to "restore the trust" in the IDF, and these concerns color how the officers are approaching the war in Gaza. For the military and its leaders charged with executing this war, the fight is deeply personal. Israel views its war as an existential, society-wide struggle. With rockets still falling on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; active fighting in Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, and beyond; and surging global anti-Israel sentiment, the IDF sees itself fighting on all fronts. The writer is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation's Project Air Force.2024-01-15 00:00:00Full Article
Israel's "People's Army" at War
(Foreign Policy) Raphael S. Cohen - Since the Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, a parade of U.S. defense officials have offered advice - largely unsolicited - about how Israel should conduct its offensive in Gaza, based on the lessons the U.S. learned from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are many reasons why Israel has so far chosen to ignore these recommendations. For starters, Iraq and Afghanistan were much larger and half a world away; Gaza is far smaller, more compact, and right next door to Israel. Then there is the fact that the U.S. lost the Afghanistan War and produced a muddled outcome in Iraq. Yet there is another important factor at play. The Israel Defense Forces' relationship with society, cultural predilections, and norms of behavior are unique. Fewer than 1% of Americans serve on active duty and all do so by choice. The IDF is at its core a draft military, designed to be what Israel's founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, called a "people's army," both a reflection of society and the glue that binds the people together. On Oct. 7, the IDF failed not only to protect the Israeli public but it failed to protect its own: At least 274 Israeli soldiers, plus dozens of local security officials, were killed that day. Current and recently retired IDF officers often told me of the need to "restore the trust" in the IDF, and these concerns color how the officers are approaching the war in Gaza. For the military and its leaders charged with executing this war, the fight is deeply personal. Israel views its war as an existential, society-wide struggle. With rockets still falling on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; active fighting in Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, and beyond; and surging global anti-Israel sentiment, the IDF sees itself fighting on all fronts. The writer is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation's Project Air Force.2024-01-15 00:00:00Full Article
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