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(Israel Hayom) Meir Ben Shabbat - While Secretary of State Antony Blinken has criticized Israel's conduct in Gaza for not achieving "an enduring result" on the ground, the same could be said about the reality in northern Samaria. In Jenin and the Tulkarm area, IDF forces go in, arrest or eliminate targets, and withdraw - only to see terror elements rear their heads again, forcing a continuous cycle of operations. Nevertheless, no one has doubted the necessity of such action. This has been refined into an almost official policy called "mowing the grass," the belief that the fight against terror is an ongoing process, not a one-time thing. The Hamas order of battle in Gaza still includes thousands of fighters, ammunition, weaponry, and tunnels. In such a situation, the debate over the "day after" is akin to arguing over the skin of a bear that has yet to be hunted. The truth must be told: There are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have been implemented over the years of conflict. Israel did not enter this war to find a replacement for Hamas but to destroy it. That is the goal. Given the current balance of power in Gaza, no entity can replace Hamas in the civilian administration of the Strip without its consent. This applies to the "Palestinian Authority," the "Dahlan camp," "technocratic ministers," or local "clan" leaders. Given this situation, it must be stated that even after seven months, the conditions for establishing an alternative to Hamas' rule have not yet matured. From Israel's perspective, the question of the "day after" in Gaza is secondary to the more important goal: destroying Hamas' military and governing capabilities and restoring Israeli deterrence. Israel must not be tempted by proposals that provide the appearance of a solution while leaving the problem intact. The writer, a former Israeli national security advisor, is chairman of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem. 2024-05-21 00:00:00Full Article
U.S. "Day After" Proposals Will Only Bolster Hamas
(Israel Hayom) Meir Ben Shabbat - While Secretary of State Antony Blinken has criticized Israel's conduct in Gaza for not achieving "an enduring result" on the ground, the same could be said about the reality in northern Samaria. In Jenin and the Tulkarm area, IDF forces go in, arrest or eliminate targets, and withdraw - only to see terror elements rear their heads again, forcing a continuous cycle of operations. Nevertheless, no one has doubted the necessity of such action. This has been refined into an almost official policy called "mowing the grass," the belief that the fight against terror is an ongoing process, not a one-time thing. The Hamas order of battle in Gaza still includes thousands of fighters, ammunition, weaponry, and tunnels. In such a situation, the debate over the "day after" is akin to arguing over the skin of a bear that has yet to be hunted. The truth must be told: There are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have been implemented over the years of conflict. Israel did not enter this war to find a replacement for Hamas but to destroy it. That is the goal. Given the current balance of power in Gaza, no entity can replace Hamas in the civilian administration of the Strip without its consent. This applies to the "Palestinian Authority," the "Dahlan camp," "technocratic ministers," or local "clan" leaders. Given this situation, it must be stated that even after seven months, the conditions for establishing an alternative to Hamas' rule have not yet matured. From Israel's perspective, the question of the "day after" in Gaza is secondary to the more important goal: destroying Hamas' military and governing capabilities and restoring Israeli deterrence. Israel must not be tempted by proposals that provide the appearance of a solution while leaving the problem intact. The writer, a former Israeli national security advisor, is chairman of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem. 2024-05-21 00:00:00Full Article
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