Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Tablet) Maj. (ret.) Andrew Fox - Western analysts are asking why the IDF is repeatedly going into areas they have already cleared and conducting further operations. These critics are looking at IDF tactics through the lens of counterinsurgency doctrine that U.S. and European militaries applied in the failed campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Western tactics were to seize a chunk of territory and clear it of enemies through military force, then hold the territory and try to conduct alternative governance while providing security. The system required forward operating bases, which meant that our enemies, embedded in the local civilian population, always knew where we were and what routes we were likely to use. They could mortar, rocket, and IED us at will. It was a recipe for endless violence and huge numbers of casualties. In the case of the 2023-24 Gaza war, Western critics have almost comically misunderstood what the Israeli military is trying to do. The IDF has absolutely no intention of using the West's clear-hold-build tactics. These were an unmitigated disaster in Afghanistan and Iraq, with both ending in humiliating defeats at the hands of technologically inferior armies. Such tactics are time-consuming and costly, requiring huge troop levels to "hold" ground, for years, if not indefinitely. Israel has a safe base nearby on the Israeli side of the Gaza border, and can enjoy the luxury of only committing to intelligence-led operations at times and on ground of their choosing - advantages that the West did not have in Iraq or Afghanistan. Hamas will not be destroyed, which means rendered totally combat ineffective. Hamas is too numerous and too entrenched within Gaza - where every male of fighting age is a potential future Hamas fighter. But they are mainly backing away from a fight in Gaza, relying on booby traps, IEDs, and small arms before melting away from decisive engagements. What is possible, however, is defeating Hamas. In Western doctrinal terms, "defeating" an enemy means reducing it to 50%-69% of its fighting strength. Will defeating Hamas be accomplished through a political solution? Definitely not. No one on the international stage has expressed any interest in helping with governance in Gaza. With no ability to impose a political arrangement in Gaza, and a Gazan desire for continued Hamas rule, the IDF answer is: Let them have Hamas. But the version of Hamas that Gazans will get is one heavily degraded militarily, with vast swaths of their tunnels and civilian-embedded infrastructure destroyed. As things stand, the operational end state looks like significant Hamas infrastructure is destroyed, its fighting capability severely degraded, and the border secured with a 1-km. buffer zone to prevent a repeat of Oct. 7, with the IDF retaining the capability to strike into Gaza at will. What we are seeing in Gaza is not a failure. It's a quite brilliant IDF operational design, within the bounds of what is realistically possible. The writer served in the British Army from 2005-21, including three tours in Afghanistan, one attached to U.S. Army Special Forces. He is a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.2024-05-26 00:00:00Full Article
Western Analysts Are Seeing Israel's War through Lens of America's Failed Counterinsurgency Doctrines
(Tablet) Maj. (ret.) Andrew Fox - Western analysts are asking why the IDF is repeatedly going into areas they have already cleared and conducting further operations. These critics are looking at IDF tactics through the lens of counterinsurgency doctrine that U.S. and European militaries applied in the failed campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Western tactics were to seize a chunk of territory and clear it of enemies through military force, then hold the territory and try to conduct alternative governance while providing security. The system required forward operating bases, which meant that our enemies, embedded in the local civilian population, always knew where we were and what routes we were likely to use. They could mortar, rocket, and IED us at will. It was a recipe for endless violence and huge numbers of casualties. In the case of the 2023-24 Gaza war, Western critics have almost comically misunderstood what the Israeli military is trying to do. The IDF has absolutely no intention of using the West's clear-hold-build tactics. These were an unmitigated disaster in Afghanistan and Iraq, with both ending in humiliating defeats at the hands of technologically inferior armies. Such tactics are time-consuming and costly, requiring huge troop levels to "hold" ground, for years, if not indefinitely. Israel has a safe base nearby on the Israeli side of the Gaza border, and can enjoy the luxury of only committing to intelligence-led operations at times and on ground of their choosing - advantages that the West did not have in Iraq or Afghanistan. Hamas will not be destroyed, which means rendered totally combat ineffective. Hamas is too numerous and too entrenched within Gaza - where every male of fighting age is a potential future Hamas fighter. But they are mainly backing away from a fight in Gaza, relying on booby traps, IEDs, and small arms before melting away from decisive engagements. What is possible, however, is defeating Hamas. In Western doctrinal terms, "defeating" an enemy means reducing it to 50%-69% of its fighting strength. Will defeating Hamas be accomplished through a political solution? Definitely not. No one on the international stage has expressed any interest in helping with governance in Gaza. With no ability to impose a political arrangement in Gaza, and a Gazan desire for continued Hamas rule, the IDF answer is: Let them have Hamas. But the version of Hamas that Gazans will get is one heavily degraded militarily, with vast swaths of their tunnels and civilian-embedded infrastructure destroyed. As things stand, the operational end state looks like significant Hamas infrastructure is destroyed, its fighting capability severely degraded, and the border secured with a 1-km. buffer zone to prevent a repeat of Oct. 7, with the IDF retaining the capability to strike into Gaza at will. What we are seeing in Gaza is not a failure. It's a quite brilliant IDF operational design, within the bounds of what is realistically possible. The writer served in the British Army from 2005-21, including three tours in Afghanistan, one attached to U.S. Army Special Forces. He is a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.2024-05-26 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|