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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Ehud Yaari - Over the past few weeks, Hamas leaders have been engaged in talks with other Palestinian factions and select Arab states to find a formula for postwar governance in Gaza. Both the Hamas Executive Committee (based in Qatar) and Yahya al-Sinwar's circle of military leaders (in Gaza) have apparently come to realize that the group cannot continue ruling Gaza on its own and must therefore look for partners. In particular, they fear that no foreign reconstruction funding will be forthcoming unless they help install a different type of administration nominally led by other Palestinian players. However, they insist that security issues not be part of this government's authority. They are confident that they can deter Arab states and other foreign powers from sending forces to Gaza, and have threatened to fight any non-Palestinian presence deployed to police or manage the Strip. In other words, Hamas is happy to let others shoulder civil responsibilities while it focuses on rebuilding its armed networks behind the scenes. With thousands of its fighters still alive, Hamas is feverishly searching for new ways to stay in charge once a ceasefire is in place. It has offered to relinquish civilian control - but only for the sake of refreshing its military arsenal, rebuilding its tunnel networks, and recruiting fresh manpower. Hamas has already gleaned around $120-200 million from taxing humanitarian convoys during the current war. In the wake of the Oct. 7 massacre, the idea of Hamas playing a role in Gaza's governance is intolerable. To prevent the implementation of this Hamas plan for the "day after," the U.S. and other Western nations could advise Arab states, the PA, and other Palestinian actors not to lend a hand to the group's political resurrection. Egyptian President al-Sisi should be put on notice that there will be a price to pay (e.g., regarding congressional oversight of annual U.S. military assistance) if his intelligence services and army personnel keep facilitating weapons smuggling to Hamas through Rafah's cross-border tunnels. The writer, a Fellow at the Washington Institute, is a Middle East commentator for Israel's Channel 12.2024-06-16 00:00:00Full Article
How Hamas Is Trying to Shape the "Day After" in Gaza
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Ehud Yaari - Over the past few weeks, Hamas leaders have been engaged in talks with other Palestinian factions and select Arab states to find a formula for postwar governance in Gaza. Both the Hamas Executive Committee (based in Qatar) and Yahya al-Sinwar's circle of military leaders (in Gaza) have apparently come to realize that the group cannot continue ruling Gaza on its own and must therefore look for partners. In particular, they fear that no foreign reconstruction funding will be forthcoming unless they help install a different type of administration nominally led by other Palestinian players. However, they insist that security issues not be part of this government's authority. They are confident that they can deter Arab states and other foreign powers from sending forces to Gaza, and have threatened to fight any non-Palestinian presence deployed to police or manage the Strip. In other words, Hamas is happy to let others shoulder civil responsibilities while it focuses on rebuilding its armed networks behind the scenes. With thousands of its fighters still alive, Hamas is feverishly searching for new ways to stay in charge once a ceasefire is in place. It has offered to relinquish civilian control - but only for the sake of refreshing its military arsenal, rebuilding its tunnel networks, and recruiting fresh manpower. Hamas has already gleaned around $120-200 million from taxing humanitarian convoys during the current war. In the wake of the Oct. 7 massacre, the idea of Hamas playing a role in Gaza's governance is intolerable. To prevent the implementation of this Hamas plan for the "day after," the U.S. and other Western nations could advise Arab states, the PA, and other Palestinian actors not to lend a hand to the group's political resurrection. Egyptian President al-Sisi should be put on notice that there will be a price to pay (e.g., regarding congressional oversight of annual U.S. military assistance) if his intelligence services and army personnel keep facilitating weapons smuggling to Hamas through Rafah's cross-border tunnels. The writer, a Fellow at the Washington Institute, is a Middle East commentator for Israel's Channel 12.2024-06-16 00:00:00Full Article
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