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(The Bulwark) Will Selber and Bill Roggio - U.S. General David Petraeus was one of the most prominent advocates of the strategy adopted to turn around the war in Iraq in the mid-2000s: population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) - whose mantra was "clear, hold, and build." From 2007 to 2010, Petraeus's COIN strategy helped stabilize Iraq. However, President Obama withdrew U.S. forces in 2011 and, less than three years later, the Islamic State captured Mosul and declared its caliphate. In Afghanistan, the COIN strategy failed utterly. Joint Provincial Reconstruction Teams served in Afghanistan's 32 provinces for nearly a decade, building hundreds of schools, roads, and bridges. However, all of these programs ultimately failed to prevent the Taliban from humiliating the U.S. and NATO. Now Petraeus is arguing that COIN should be implemented in Gaza. Despite his good intentions, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) should politely decline his recommendations. Instead, they should continue grinding away at Hamas until they are no longer the governing power. The IDF is not fighting an insurgency. It is fighting a terror state that may employ guerrilla warfare tactics. COIN requires time to build rapport with host nation security forces. It's built by partnering with indigenous forces. Which group inside of Gaza could partner with the IDF like this and still survive? The PA is a weak, feeble group incapable of securing the West Bank. How would they secure Gaza working with the IDF? Furthermore, while Iraq and Afghanistan have large porous borders, Gaza doesn't. Thousands of foreign fighters can't cross into Gaza to support Hamas. Now, with the Philadelphi Corridor finally secured, the IDF can restrict Hamas's resupply of weapons, materiel, and manpower. Will Selber is a retired Middle East Foreign Area Officer in the U.S. Air Force with 20 years inside the intelligence community. Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the editor of FDD's Long War Journal. 2024-07-14 00:00:00Full Article
Why Counterinsurgency Won't Work in Gaza
(The Bulwark) Will Selber and Bill Roggio - U.S. General David Petraeus was one of the most prominent advocates of the strategy adopted to turn around the war in Iraq in the mid-2000s: population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) - whose mantra was "clear, hold, and build." From 2007 to 2010, Petraeus's COIN strategy helped stabilize Iraq. However, President Obama withdrew U.S. forces in 2011 and, less than three years later, the Islamic State captured Mosul and declared its caliphate. In Afghanistan, the COIN strategy failed utterly. Joint Provincial Reconstruction Teams served in Afghanistan's 32 provinces for nearly a decade, building hundreds of schools, roads, and bridges. However, all of these programs ultimately failed to prevent the Taliban from humiliating the U.S. and NATO. Now Petraeus is arguing that COIN should be implemented in Gaza. Despite his good intentions, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) should politely decline his recommendations. Instead, they should continue grinding away at Hamas until they are no longer the governing power. The IDF is not fighting an insurgency. It is fighting a terror state that may employ guerrilla warfare tactics. COIN requires time to build rapport with host nation security forces. It's built by partnering with indigenous forces. Which group inside of Gaza could partner with the IDF like this and still survive? The PA is a weak, feeble group incapable of securing the West Bank. How would they secure Gaza working with the IDF? Furthermore, while Iraq and Afghanistan have large porous borders, Gaza doesn't. Thousands of foreign fighters can't cross into Gaza to support Hamas. Now, with the Philadelphi Corridor finally secured, the IDF can restrict Hamas's resupply of weapons, materiel, and manpower. Will Selber is a retired Middle East Foreign Area Officer in the U.S. Air Force with 20 years inside the intelligence community. Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the editor of FDD's Long War Journal. 2024-07-14 00:00:00Full Article
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