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Media:
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(BESA Center for Strategic Studies-Bar-Ilan University) Brig.-Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal - The key lesson to be learned from Oct. 7 is the failure of a defensive strategy that allowed the terrorist armies to build up major strength on our borders without hindrance. Israel's flawed border strategy rested on the false assumption that Hamas and Hizbullah could be tamed through withdrawals and understandings, and that they could be deterred by the threat of Israeli air power. Every military expert knows that there is no chance of stopping a significant attack on a border line that has no depth. Under conditions in which an enemy is constantly present and ready, there is no chance for early warning. The defense forces will always be surprised. The border turned from a political line into a military conceptual fixation. Military thought became enslaved to the division between "our territory" and "their territory." Our forces have to know what is happening across the border and must be able to prevent evolving threats. The front should benefit from good intelligence and air support but should not be dependent on them, especially not in surprise scenarios. Intelligence gathering should rely on mobile capabilities and unmanned aircraft, because cameras mounted on masts are too easy a target. Sustainable defense cannot be based on an obstacle and light forces. It should be built from the presence of significant reserve forces at the front. Training facilities close to the border will allow this. A border is a political concept, not a military one. It is necessary to remove the misperception of the border. From now on, call it a front. The writer is former commander of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, a department of the Israel Defense Forces. 2024-08-08 00:00:00Full Article
It's Not a Border, It's a Front
(BESA Center for Strategic Studies-Bar-Ilan University) Brig.-Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal - The key lesson to be learned from Oct. 7 is the failure of a defensive strategy that allowed the terrorist armies to build up major strength on our borders without hindrance. Israel's flawed border strategy rested on the false assumption that Hamas and Hizbullah could be tamed through withdrawals and understandings, and that they could be deterred by the threat of Israeli air power. Every military expert knows that there is no chance of stopping a significant attack on a border line that has no depth. Under conditions in which an enemy is constantly present and ready, there is no chance for early warning. The defense forces will always be surprised. The border turned from a political line into a military conceptual fixation. Military thought became enslaved to the division between "our territory" and "their territory." Our forces have to know what is happening across the border and must be able to prevent evolving threats. The front should benefit from good intelligence and air support but should not be dependent on them, especially not in surprise scenarios. Intelligence gathering should rely on mobile capabilities and unmanned aircraft, because cameras mounted on masts are too easy a target. Sustainable defense cannot be based on an obstacle and light forces. It should be built from the presence of significant reserve forces at the front. Training facilities close to the border will allow this. A border is a political concept, not a military one. It is necessary to remove the misperception of the border. From now on, call it a front. The writer is former commander of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, a department of the Israel Defense Forces. 2024-08-08 00:00:00Full Article
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