Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Ben Fishman, Hanin Ghaddar, Assaf Orion, and Dennis Ross - On Aug. 25, Israel carried out large-scale preemptive strikes against Hizbullah targets in Lebanon, acting on intelligence that the group was preparing an imminent attack in retaliation for the killing of senior operative Fuad Shukr in the heart of Beirut. In the hours that followed, Hizbullah fired hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel, causing little damage. Hizbullah had delayed its retaliation for nearly a month. Its main obstacle has been the dominance of Israeli intelligence, which has enabled hundreds of damaging strikes on Hizbullah assets and uncovered its attack plan with enough lead time to organize and launch preemptive action. Hizbullah leaders realized that they have not only lost the element of surprise, but also failed to deter Israel by warning it about dire retaliation. U.S. deployments to the region have increased steadily since October and presumably deterred Hizbullah from opening a full-scale northern front when Israel's war with Hamas first erupted. Demonstrations of allied defensive power and coordination have likely boosted deterrence as well, as seen when the IDF, the U.S. military, and their partners intercepted nearly all of the missiles and drones Iran launched on April 13. Yet, if defensive responses are the only ones Washington is prepared to consider, then U.S. deterrence will inevitably erode, and Iran and its proxies will be incentivized to attack again. Deterrence only works if one party believes the other will use offensive force. At some point, the U.S. must demonstrate its willingness to take on one of Tehran's proxies. For example, the Houthis have effectively closed the Red Sea to the bulk of international shipping for months, despite U.S.-led defensive and limited offensive operations against the group. 2024-09-01 00:00:00Full Article
What the Latest Hizbullah-Israel Clash Reveals about Deterrence and Escalation
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Ben Fishman, Hanin Ghaddar, Assaf Orion, and Dennis Ross - On Aug. 25, Israel carried out large-scale preemptive strikes against Hizbullah targets in Lebanon, acting on intelligence that the group was preparing an imminent attack in retaliation for the killing of senior operative Fuad Shukr in the heart of Beirut. In the hours that followed, Hizbullah fired hundreds of rockets and drones at Israel, causing little damage. Hizbullah had delayed its retaliation for nearly a month. Its main obstacle has been the dominance of Israeli intelligence, which has enabled hundreds of damaging strikes on Hizbullah assets and uncovered its attack plan with enough lead time to organize and launch preemptive action. Hizbullah leaders realized that they have not only lost the element of surprise, but also failed to deter Israel by warning it about dire retaliation. U.S. deployments to the region have increased steadily since October and presumably deterred Hizbullah from opening a full-scale northern front when Israel's war with Hamas first erupted. Demonstrations of allied defensive power and coordination have likely boosted deterrence as well, as seen when the IDF, the U.S. military, and their partners intercepted nearly all of the missiles and drones Iran launched on April 13. Yet, if defensive responses are the only ones Washington is prepared to consider, then U.S. deterrence will inevitably erode, and Iran and its proxies will be incentivized to attack again. Deterrence only works if one party believes the other will use offensive force. At some point, the U.S. must demonstrate its willingness to take on one of Tehran's proxies. For example, the Houthis have effectively closed the Red Sea to the bulk of international shipping for months, despite U.S.-led defensive and limited offensive operations against the group. 2024-09-01 00:00:00Full Article
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