Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(MEMRI) Col. (ret.) Yigal Carmon - Flawed assumptions led to the disaster on Oct. 7. The first was that Hamas was deterred by the blows struck against it by Israel in previous rounds of fighting. The IDF did indeed severely damage Hamas's combat capabilities in previous rounds of fighting, but this had no long-term impact on them - and certainly not on their intentions. After every round of fighting there was rebuilding, and each time, Hamas ended up better off than it was before. The second was that Hamas boasting should not be taken seriously and was strictly for internal consumption. The prevailing view was that because Israel allowed Hamas to build itself into an independent political body, Hamas would not want to jeopardize this status by attacking Israel, and that it was now focusing on building and governing. The third was that Gaza was experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis. This assumption is an absolute lie, as anyone who visited Gaza prior to Oct. 7 - including foreign journalists and aid workers - has seen. The violent 2018 "March of Return" events, the rioting at the border fence, and the rounds of Gaza-Israel fighting were all explained away by the Gazans' need to improve their harsh economic situation - not by any ideological intent or practical, organized plan to attack Israel. The fourth was that a high standard of living in Gaza created with aid funds would moderate, and even supersede, the Hamas ideology that is based on eliminating Israel and annihilating the Jews. Underpinning this idea is the postmodernist Western political doctrine that all ideologies are legitimate and equal, and that what these ideologies say to the outside world must not be taken too seriously because ideological consciousness can be shaped by monetary incentives. The writer, former counter-terrorism advisor to two Israeli prime ministers, is founder and president of the Middle East Media Research Institute. 2024-10-08 00:00:00Full Article
Never Again? How to Prevent the Next Oct. 7
(MEMRI) Col. (ret.) Yigal Carmon - Flawed assumptions led to the disaster on Oct. 7. The first was that Hamas was deterred by the blows struck against it by Israel in previous rounds of fighting. The IDF did indeed severely damage Hamas's combat capabilities in previous rounds of fighting, but this had no long-term impact on them - and certainly not on their intentions. After every round of fighting there was rebuilding, and each time, Hamas ended up better off than it was before. The second was that Hamas boasting should not be taken seriously and was strictly for internal consumption. The prevailing view was that because Israel allowed Hamas to build itself into an independent political body, Hamas would not want to jeopardize this status by attacking Israel, and that it was now focusing on building and governing. The third was that Gaza was experiencing a severe humanitarian crisis. This assumption is an absolute lie, as anyone who visited Gaza prior to Oct. 7 - including foreign journalists and aid workers - has seen. The violent 2018 "March of Return" events, the rioting at the border fence, and the rounds of Gaza-Israel fighting were all explained away by the Gazans' need to improve their harsh economic situation - not by any ideological intent or practical, organized plan to attack Israel. The fourth was that a high standard of living in Gaza created with aid funds would moderate, and even supersede, the Hamas ideology that is based on eliminating Israel and annihilating the Jews. Underpinning this idea is the postmodernist Western political doctrine that all ideologies are legitimate and equal, and that what these ideologies say to the outside world must not be taken too seriously because ideological consciousness can be shaped by monetary incentives. The writer, former counter-terrorism advisor to two Israeli prime ministers, is founder and president of the Middle East Media Research Institute. 2024-10-08 00:00:00Full Article
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