Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Israel Hayom) Itay Ilnai - In September 2024, the IDF geared up for a high-stakes commando operation to destroy a clandestine precision missile factory established by Iran on Syrian territory. However, a significant concern loomed over the decision-makers in Jerusalem - the potential American reaction. "As we approached the Syria operation, tensions with the U.S. were at a breaking point," an Israeli source reveals. "Throughout the conflict, the U.S.' primary concern was the possibility of opening a front against Iran and spiraling into a full-scale war. Their watchword was 'stability.' It was evident to me that an attack on the Iranian missile factory at this juncture would not sit well with the American administration. From their viewpoint, it was an absolute non-starter." IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi believed coordinating the operation with the Americans was unavoidable. However, Israel's top political echelon had become convinced that if the White House got wind of the operation beforehand, American officials would staunchly oppose it and might even leak its existence to derail it. The resolution to this dilemma, mirroring the approach taken throughout the tumultuous Israeli-American relationship during the war, centered on presentation. It was decided that Halevi would be the one to brief the Americans, starting with his close associate, CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla. There was a perception that Halevi was viewed by the White House as a moderate and judicious figure, driven by professional considerations and inclined to avoid escalation with Iran. Halevi and Kurilla had developed a strong professional rapport over the course of the war, which had blossomed into a close friendship. Halevi briefed Kurilla on the specifics of the Syrian operation and its necessity, allayed concerns about igniting a conflict with Iran, and requested that Kurilla relay the message to his superiors in Washington. The approach proved effective. The White House was persuaded not to obstruct the Syrian operation, and the rest is history. During the war, collaboration between the two nations reached unprecedented levels, with the U.S. meticulously approving Israeli attack strategies, and senior White House officials participating in cabinet meetings and General Staff forums in Israel - a level of involvement previously unseen. Yet there were instances where Israel executed critical operations without prior notification to the U.S. - such as the targeting of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah - or took actions that directly contradicted the White House's explicit stance, as seen with the incursion into Rafah. Heated arguments between the two sides were not uncommon. Despite these disagreements, Netanyahu viewed sustained American support for Israel as an invaluable asset. The Israeli political and security leadership unanimously agreed that without Washington's backing, Israel would be compelled to halt the war before achieving all its objectives.2025-01-16 00:00:00Full Article
When a Daring IDF Strike Deep in Syrian Territory Challenged U.S.-Israel Ties
(Israel Hayom) Itay Ilnai - In September 2024, the IDF geared up for a high-stakes commando operation to destroy a clandestine precision missile factory established by Iran on Syrian territory. However, a significant concern loomed over the decision-makers in Jerusalem - the potential American reaction. "As we approached the Syria operation, tensions with the U.S. were at a breaking point," an Israeli source reveals. "Throughout the conflict, the U.S.' primary concern was the possibility of opening a front against Iran and spiraling into a full-scale war. Their watchword was 'stability.' It was evident to me that an attack on the Iranian missile factory at this juncture would not sit well with the American administration. From their viewpoint, it was an absolute non-starter." IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi believed coordinating the operation with the Americans was unavoidable. However, Israel's top political echelon had become convinced that if the White House got wind of the operation beforehand, American officials would staunchly oppose it and might even leak its existence to derail it. The resolution to this dilemma, mirroring the approach taken throughout the tumultuous Israeli-American relationship during the war, centered on presentation. It was decided that Halevi would be the one to brief the Americans, starting with his close associate, CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla. There was a perception that Halevi was viewed by the White House as a moderate and judicious figure, driven by professional considerations and inclined to avoid escalation with Iran. Halevi and Kurilla had developed a strong professional rapport over the course of the war, which had blossomed into a close friendship. Halevi briefed Kurilla on the specifics of the Syrian operation and its necessity, allayed concerns about igniting a conflict with Iran, and requested that Kurilla relay the message to his superiors in Washington. The approach proved effective. The White House was persuaded not to obstruct the Syrian operation, and the rest is history. During the war, collaboration between the two nations reached unprecedented levels, with the U.S. meticulously approving Israeli attack strategies, and senior White House officials participating in cabinet meetings and General Staff forums in Israel - a level of involvement previously unseen. Yet there were instances where Israel executed critical operations without prior notification to the U.S. - such as the targeting of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah - or took actions that directly contradicted the White House's explicit stance, as seen with the incursion into Rafah. Heated arguments between the two sides were not uncommon. Despite these disagreements, Netanyahu viewed sustained American support for Israel as an invaluable asset. The Israeli political and security leadership unanimously agreed that without Washington's backing, Israel would be compelled to halt the war before achieving all its objectives.2025-01-16 00:00:00Full Article
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