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Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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Government:
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(Ynet News) Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Yanai - Deterrence is based on the assumption that adversaries will refrain from attacking out of fear of severe retaliation. However, deterrence is an elusive and problematic concept. Deterrence does not guarantee the prevention of threats. Deterrence operates in the psychological and perceptual sphere. But how can one accurately assess how an adversary perceives the severity of the consequences or the credibility of the threat? States and terrorist organizations may interpret deterrent threats differently from how they were intended. Moreover, deterrence assumes a rational calculation of cost versus benefit. However, enemies are often driven by ideological or religious beliefs, which do not conform to materialistic rationality. History is filled with cases where nationalistic, political, or personal motivations outweighed rational calculations. Additionally, deterrence is not a stable model but rather a temporary state that erodes over time. Internal political shifts, geopolitical changes, and military developments alter an adversary's strategic calculus, leading to reassessments of risk. Over time, enemies may test the limits of deterrence. When deterrence erodes, the adversary's response often takes the form of a surprise attack. Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Yom Kippur War, and the October 7 Hamas attack are all examples of when adversaries, despite being perceived as deterred, launched offensives based on strategic calculations that differed entirely from those assumed by the deterring side. For all these reasons, deterrence cannot serve as the cornerstone of Israel's national security doctrine. Instead, Israel must embrace a doctrine of prevention: proactively denying adversaries the capabilities and motivations to act against it in the first place. The writer headed the IDF Planning Branch and the Ground Forces Command. 2025-03-06 00:00:00Full Article
Deterrence Is Just an Educated Guess
(Ynet News) Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Yanai - Deterrence is based on the assumption that adversaries will refrain from attacking out of fear of severe retaliation. However, deterrence is an elusive and problematic concept. Deterrence does not guarantee the prevention of threats. Deterrence operates in the psychological and perceptual sphere. But how can one accurately assess how an adversary perceives the severity of the consequences or the credibility of the threat? States and terrorist organizations may interpret deterrent threats differently from how they were intended. Moreover, deterrence assumes a rational calculation of cost versus benefit. However, enemies are often driven by ideological or religious beliefs, which do not conform to materialistic rationality. History is filled with cases where nationalistic, political, or personal motivations outweighed rational calculations. Additionally, deterrence is not a stable model but rather a temporary state that erodes over time. Internal political shifts, geopolitical changes, and military developments alter an adversary's strategic calculus, leading to reassessments of risk. Over time, enemies may test the limits of deterrence. When deterrence erodes, the adversary's response often takes the form of a surprise attack. Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Yom Kippur War, and the October 7 Hamas attack are all examples of when adversaries, despite being perceived as deterred, launched offensives based on strategic calculations that differed entirely from those assumed by the deterring side. For all these reasons, deterrence cannot serve as the cornerstone of Israel's national security doctrine. Instead, Israel must embrace a doctrine of prevention: proactively denying adversaries the capabilities and motivations to act against it in the first place. The writer headed the IDF Planning Branch and the Ground Forces Command. 2025-03-06 00:00:00Full Article
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