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(Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security) Prof. Efraim Inbar - Israel's original military doctrine, formulated by David Ben-Gurion, emphasized three core elements: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. However, Israel suffered major deterrence and intelligence failures in October 1973 and October 2023. In both instances, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) failed to deter its adversaries and Israel's intelligence apparatus did not provide adequate warnings of the impending attacks. Deterrence is an elusive and problematic psychological concept. Military superiority and the threat of retaliation do not always succeed in dissuading an adversary from the attack. For Hamas, the anticipated benefits of confronting Israel outweighed the costs of potential punishment, as its religious motivations overrode the logic of rational deterrence. Israel underestimated Hamas's resolve to destroy it and its belief that this objective is attainable. Furthermore, Israel failed to recognize that its containment policy, implemented over two decades, had eroded its deterrence. With regard to intelligence failures, analysts overlooked evidence that did not support existing theories. Israeli intelligence knew about Hamas's attack plan, but this was not effectively communicated to decision-makers with the appropriate context. Analysts misread signals and intentions. In addition, the IDF was overly reliant on technological means of intelligence collection at the expense of human intelligence. Human beings are inherently fallible. Consequently, we cannot expect to receive early warning about the erosion of deterrence or an imminent attack. Instead, Israel has no choice but to build a better defensive posture while facing a multifront scenario. Israel needs a larger standing army along with larger reserve units in border communities. The former policy of containment/restraint has proven counter-productive. Containment conveys weakness in a region where the political culture values the use of force. Fear remains the most effective political currency in the Middle East. Kicking the can down the road is rarely a prudent course of action. Despite the inherent risks involved, Israel must use preemptive strikes, a core element of its original military doctrine. Today Israel is paying a staggering price for its delay in mounting a strong military response to the buildup of military capabilities by Hamas and Hizbullah. The writer, former head of JISS, is professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University. 2025-04-15 00:00:00Full Article
Time to Revise Israel's Military Doctrine
(Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security) Prof. Efraim Inbar - Israel's original military doctrine, formulated by David Ben-Gurion, emphasized three core elements: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. However, Israel suffered major deterrence and intelligence failures in October 1973 and October 2023. In both instances, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) failed to deter its adversaries and Israel's intelligence apparatus did not provide adequate warnings of the impending attacks. Deterrence is an elusive and problematic psychological concept. Military superiority and the threat of retaliation do not always succeed in dissuading an adversary from the attack. For Hamas, the anticipated benefits of confronting Israel outweighed the costs of potential punishment, as its religious motivations overrode the logic of rational deterrence. Israel underestimated Hamas's resolve to destroy it and its belief that this objective is attainable. Furthermore, Israel failed to recognize that its containment policy, implemented over two decades, had eroded its deterrence. With regard to intelligence failures, analysts overlooked evidence that did not support existing theories. Israeli intelligence knew about Hamas's attack plan, but this was not effectively communicated to decision-makers with the appropriate context. Analysts misread signals and intentions. In addition, the IDF was overly reliant on technological means of intelligence collection at the expense of human intelligence. Human beings are inherently fallible. Consequently, we cannot expect to receive early warning about the erosion of deterrence or an imminent attack. Instead, Israel has no choice but to build a better defensive posture while facing a multifront scenario. Israel needs a larger standing army along with larger reserve units in border communities. The former policy of containment/restraint has proven counter-productive. Containment conveys weakness in a region where the political culture values the use of force. Fear remains the most effective political currency in the Middle East. Kicking the can down the road is rarely a prudent course of action. Despite the inherent risks involved, Israel must use preemptive strikes, a core element of its original military doctrine. Today Israel is paying a staggering price for its delay in mounting a strong military response to the buildup of military capabilities by Hamas and Hizbullah. The writer, former head of JISS, is professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University. 2025-04-15 00:00:00Full Article
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