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Lessons for the Gulf States from the Iran Conflict

(Arab Center-Washington) Kristian Coates Ulrichsen - What lessons may be drawn from the 12 days of conflict that brought the region to the brink of a scenario long dreaded by many in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)? It was notable that the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities were carried out by bombers that flew from the U.S. and by cruise missiles fired from a submarine, rather than by any of the military assets positioned in the Gulf states. Similarly, the U.S. and UK launched their 2024-25 strikes against Yemen's Houthis from aircraft carriers and submarines as well as from bases in Cyprus rather than from facilities in the Gulf. While the U.S. decision not to use Gulf-based military assets was mindful of regional dynamics, it has led some in the U.S. to ask why the forces are stationed in the Gulf if they cannot be used in such missions and are sitting ducks for retaliation. Iran did respond to the June 21 U.S. attack with its carefully managed June 23 launch of missiles against the al-Udeid base, the largest and most important American base in the Middle East. Excitable commentary about the potential for Iran to "close" the Strait of Hormuz to shipping was hollow. Iran does possess the capability to harass shipping passing through the strait, but a full-scale disruption was never in the cards, not least because closure would have hit Iran's main oil export terminal at Kharg, inside the Gulf, as much as it would have affected the Gulf states, including Kuwait and Qatar, whose oil and gas cargoes are almost wholly reliant on passage through Hormuz. Shipments of Iranian oil to China, its largest consumer, would also have been affected by action in the strait. Israel's campaign largely bypassed Iran's oil and gas infrastructure along the coastline of the Gulf, apart from a June 14 Israeli strike on a natural gas processing facility linked to operations at the South Pars gas field, which could have led to Iran's targeting the Gulf states' own energy infrastructure. There is thus a sense that the conflict between Iran and Israel could have been worse, at least from the Gulf states' perspective. GCC states will now engage with an Iran weakened by its inability to prevent Israel and the U.S. from penetrating its air defenses and by the steady dismantling of key elements of the "Axis of Resistance." The writer is a non-resident Senior Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC (ACW), and a Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East at Rice University.
2025-07-17 00:00:00
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