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[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Ephraim Asculai - Given the official U.S. statements, backed by extraordinary visual evidence, there is little doubt that the Israeli Air Force raid on the night of September 6, 2007, destroyed a building housing a nuclear reactor. One of the longer term effects is its impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Syria, despite its NPT obligations, concealed the existence of the installation and repeatedly denied the facts to the world and to the IAEA. Syria has been trying to buy a nuclear reactor from several sources for a long time. It had sought to buy a research reactor from Argentina in the mid-1990s, but this failed when Argentina's foreign minister told Syria that it would not sell it a reactor unless Syria signed a peace treaty with Israel. Syria then tried, unsuccessfully, to buy a reactor from Russia. Apparently, Syria then concluded a secret deal with North Korea. Had the reactor been intended for truly peaceful uses, it would have been declared to the IAEA. Furthermore, Syria acted with astounding speed to raze the stricken installation and put up another military installation on the old foundations, making it almost impossible for any investigators to reveal the original purpose of the site. What would have actually happened if information about the Syrian installation had first been provided to the IAEA? Given the historical precedents, the IAEA director general would likely have deplored the fact that the reactor had not been declared in a timely manner, accepted Syrian assurances that hitherto the reactor would be safeguarded, and stated that Syria had the right to build and operate a nuclear reactor, as long as it was safeguarded. This would have resulted in the potential for the production of plutonium, as was demonstrated by this reactor's sibling - the Yongbyon reactor. The author worked in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission for 40 years. 2008-04-30 01:00:00Full Article
Syria, the NPT, and the IAEA
[Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University] Ephraim Asculai - Given the official U.S. statements, backed by extraordinary visual evidence, there is little doubt that the Israeli Air Force raid on the night of September 6, 2007, destroyed a building housing a nuclear reactor. One of the longer term effects is its impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Syria, despite its NPT obligations, concealed the existence of the installation and repeatedly denied the facts to the world and to the IAEA. Syria has been trying to buy a nuclear reactor from several sources for a long time. It had sought to buy a research reactor from Argentina in the mid-1990s, but this failed when Argentina's foreign minister told Syria that it would not sell it a reactor unless Syria signed a peace treaty with Israel. Syria then tried, unsuccessfully, to buy a reactor from Russia. Apparently, Syria then concluded a secret deal with North Korea. Had the reactor been intended for truly peaceful uses, it would have been declared to the IAEA. Furthermore, Syria acted with astounding speed to raze the stricken installation and put up another military installation on the old foundations, making it almost impossible for any investigators to reveal the original purpose of the site. What would have actually happened if information about the Syrian installation had first been provided to the IAEA? Given the historical precedents, the IAEA director general would likely have deplored the fact that the reactor had not been declared in a timely manner, accepted Syrian assurances that hitherto the reactor would be safeguarded, and stated that Syria had the right to build and operate a nuclear reactor, as long as it was safeguarded. This would have resulted in the potential for the production of plutonium, as was demonstrated by this reactor's sibling - the Yongbyon reactor. The author worked in the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission for 40 years. 2008-04-30 01:00:00Full Article
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