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Source: http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2628
In the Wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America's "Grand Strategy" for the New Palestinian Authority
[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Robert Satloff - Before Washington proceeds too far down the path of propping up Mahmoud Abbas and resuscitating Fatah, the administration should take a critical look at the policies that failed to help develop the Palestinian Authority into a truly effective, accountable, transparent government, or to impede Hamas' rise. In this context, pursuit of an Israeli-Palestinian "political horizon" may in fact run counter to the interests and preferences of both sides. Instead, investing in an Arab-Palestinian political horizon - including early negotiation on the outline of an eventual Jordanian-Palestinian confederation - may be more realistic, valuable, and effective. So far, the administration has responded with the main elements of its previously failed policy: some security assistance, though no demand for the transformation of the PA/Fatah security establishment; some economic assistance, though no requirement for change in the PA's governance or fight against corruption. President Bush said in 2002: "A Palestinian state will never be created by terror - it will be built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change, or veiled attempt to preserve the status quo." In practical terms, this would mean the following: Abbas should not only outlaw Hamas' extralegal militia - the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades - but also ban Fatah's own extralegal militia - the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades - and truly implement a policy of government monopoly on force. Abbas should commit to credible mechanisms to ensure that no U.S. funds find their way to either Hamas-controlled Gaza or the various PA and Fatah political, cultural, educational, and media institutions that still advocate violence against Israel and Jews. Abbas should implement the full range of existing Oslo-era commitments, which address a vast array of issues from security cooperation to legitimate political activity. Rhetoric to the contrary, there is reason to believe that neither Israelis nor Palestinians are actually eager to achieve rapid diplomatic movement. No Israeli government is likely to consider ceding critical assets to a Palestinian interlocutor so weak that it lost power in the one small piece of territory once under its total control. And no rump Palestinian government, still reeling from defeat, is likely to make concessions on the key issues - such as refugees - essential to any peace deal. In the current environment, it would be no surprise if leaders on both sides agreed that now is not really the most propitious time to press for diplomatic progress, though they may want the illusion of diplomacy for local political purposes. Yet it is unclear why Washington would want to busy itself with an empty exercise that distracts from the important business of fixing the problems that produced the current situation.