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The Syrian Regime's Military Solution to the War
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Jeffrey White - A regime victory is possible in Syria. The outlines of a regime strategy for winning the war are visible. This strategy hinges on the staying power of the regime and its allies, the generation of adequate forces, operational success, and continued divisions within rebel forces. The regime fights its war under broad strategic principles. The first entails using whatever level of violence it believes is necessary to defeat the armed opposition and break the will of its civilian supporters. After seizing an area formerly under rebel control, the regime engages in reprisal attacks on area civilians: executions, looting, the burning of homes and businesses. With the assistance of its allies, especially Russia and its UN Security Council veto, the regime has successfully fended off every diplomatic threat from the West. It has played along with various ceasefire initiatives as long as they did not impede its military operations. Syrian officials may well travel to Geneva, but they will not be there to surrender the keys to Damascus - but rather both to keep the rebels' backers entangled in fruitless negotiations and to deepen divisions among the rebels. Another regime principle is to keep telling its story. In the regime's narrative, its forces are winning a war against "terrorists" and the regime remains strong and cohesive. To further this narrative, the regime has increasingly succeeded in advancing perceptions of a growing terrorist threat in Syria and focusing attention on its own battlefield victories. While the regime is not certain to win the kind of victory it seeks, and may have to settle for less, the war is now moving in its favor and prospects for a reversal do not look good. Regarding the Geneva talks, the regime's approach to the war suggests that it will not negotiate seriously with the rebels. And given its increasing success on the battlefield, the continued support of its allies, and a divided and feckless opposition, there is no reason why it should. The writer is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute.