|
Trending Topics
|
Preventing an Iranian Breakout after a Nuclear Deal
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) James F. Jeffrey and David Pollock - Assuming a final Iranian nuclear agreement is achieved, the task of the U.S. and the rest of the P5+1 to manage the threat of an Iranian nuclear program will not slacken. Thus, the arrangements to encourage Iran to stick with an agreement will be every bit as important as the specifics of an agreement itself. Furthermore, even with an agreement, the U.S. and its partners will face a long-term Iranian push for hegemony in the Middle East. In any likely final agreement with Iran, a residual nuclear enrichment program, however undesirable, will likely be permitted. This will necessitate a regime to prevent Iran from breaking out of that agreement to develop nuclear weapons, or exploiting the threat of a breakout for regional intimidation. Such a regime would require three interlocking components: specific limitations on Iran's program, in order to maximize Iran's prospective breakout time; extensive verification, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities to spot any breakout as soon as possible; and credible response scenarios should a breakout occur. Thus, credibility must urgently be restored to the much-doubted U.S. threat of military force against Iran.