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Source: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/The-Case-for-Zero-Enrichment-in-Iran
The Case for Zero Enrichment in Iran
(Arms Control Today) Michael Singh - In the November 24 first-step nuclear accord, the P5+1 all but concedes that Iran will be permitted to enrich uranium in perpetuity. U.S. negotiators now characterize their previous position that Iran should halt enrichment as "maximalist." Yet this shift away from a zero-enrichment negotiating position, which represents a significant diplomatic victory for Iran, is misguided and unnecessary. Iran has no practical need for uranium enrichment, unless its actual desire is to build or preserve the option to build a nuclear weapon. Allowing Iran to enrich complicates the task of verifying that Iran is not diverting ostensibly safeguarded material to a parallel, covert nuclear weapons program. If Iran is permitted to enrich, by implication it also will be permitted to mine, convert, and stockpile uranium. In addition, it will be permitted to manufacture centrifuges and possibly import centrifuge components and related materials. Under the joint plan, Iran is even permitted to continue to research and test advanced centrifuges. Zero enrichment is hardly a maximalist position; it entails offering Iran something it deeply needs (sanctions relief) in exchange for something it does not (enrichment). There was no tactical need for the P5+1 to walk away from zero enrichment. The writer is managing director of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.