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Source: http://www.inss.org.il/publication/strengthening-the-jcpoa/
Strengthening the Iran Nuclear Deal
(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Ephraim Asculai, Emily B. Landau, Daniel Shapiro, and Moshe Ya'alon - To strengthen the Iran nuclear deal without opening it to renegotiation, there are five main areas of concern: missiles, inspections, transparency, sanctions, and the sunset provisions. Iran's insistence on not including its missiles as part of the nuclear negotiation effectively left the field open to the U.S. and Europeans to introduce whatever new understandings they see fit. However, a source of concern is the tendency to relate only to "long-range missiles." It is imperative to drop this misguided emphasis on range, as medium-range missiles already cover Israel, the Gulf states, and Turkey. Discussion must encompass all missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead. We urge reintegrating the standard for dangerous missiles set by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987: any missile with a range over 300 km. that can carry a payload of over 500 kg. The demand for anytime/anyplace inspection rights was downgraded to convoluted provisions that enable Iran to delay an inspection and play for time. This ambiguity must be resolved and regular inspections must be conducted at military facilities. The lack of transparency regarding Iran's nuclear activities and plans has become the norm since the deal was implemented. The quarterly IAEA reports on Iran now lack essential data that had been included in pre-JCPOA reports, and there are side-deals concluded between Iran and the IAEA that have been kept confidential. Increasing pressure on Iran - including in response to missile tests, support for terror, action in Syria, and human rights violations - is essential as part of a broad effort to accumulate leverage over Iran. Absent such leverage, there will be no possibility of strengthening the deal through renewed negotiations with the Iranians. The Trump administration is trying to achieve with the Europeans a supplementary accord that would cover the pressing issues of Iran's missile development and need for strengthened inspections, with no time limits. The administration also wants to significantly extend the limitations on Iran's work on the fuel cycle. Everything turns on political will - if it exists, agreeing to these steps should not entail a lengthy process.