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Source: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-israel-slept-yadlin-evental
Why Israel Slept: The War in Gaza and the Search for Security
(Foreign Affairs) Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin and Col. (ret.) Udi Evental - In a barbaric surprise attack launched by Hamas on Oct. 7, more Jews were slaughtered than on any day since the Holocaust. Around 1,200 people were killed that day (the equivalent of around 42,500 Americans, adjusting for population) and some 240 were kidnapped - including young children and elderly people. On that fateful day, the country's intelligence and military institutions were unable to keep citizens safe. For years, the country's political and military establishment had allowed intolerable threats to gather, seeking to establish a modus vivendi with the de facto Hamas state in Gaza based on deterrence, aiming to extend periods of tranquility. Israel cannot return to the status quo that existed before Oct. 7. One must push the country's defense institutions and security strategy back toward certain basic principles from which they have strayed in recent years. Israel's national security doctrine includes four main pillars: deterrence, early warning, defense, and decisive victory. Because of Israel's overreliance on deterrence, and its tacit acceptance of a prolonged buildup of Hamas forces in Gaza (facilitated by Iranian funding and expertise), the group had achieved an unusually high level of operational readiness to carry out a major attack. It had also identified significant vulnerabilities in Israel's defenses around Gaza. According to Israel's security doctrine, when deterrence fails, the intelligence community assumes the vital role of providing early warning, enabling the IDF to prepare and respond effectively to the threat. But a catastrophic misconception had taken hold within the Israeli intelligence community in recent years. Hamas' fundamental aspiration is to inflict harm on Israel, with the ultimate aim of obliterating it. But Israeli intelligence and decision-makers had come to believe that Hamas' responsibilities in Gaza - where it essentially governed a de facto state of over two million Palestinians - had tempered its extremism. When deterrence falters and early warnings fail to materialize, Israel's traditional security doctrine falls back on the IDF's defensive capabilities. But Israel failed to imagine an aboveground invasion and did not reinforce defenses around Gaza in proportion to Hamas' growing military capabilities. Consequently, Israeli forces in the area were outnumbered and caught off guard during the Sukkot holiday. The fourth pillar of Israel's security doctrine is the concept of achieving a decisive military outcome. Israel now understands that although the jihadi ideology of Hamas may persist, the IDF must dismantle the organization's military capabilities. Israel has come to see that it cannot coexist with a jihadi Islamist state akin to ISIS at its doorstep in Gaza. The era of intermittent cycles of fighting and ceasefires in Gaza is over. The ground operation will end only when Hamas ceases to function as a governing authority in Gaza and its military capabilities are significantly degraded. Targeted incursions into Gaza and airstrikes against Hamas will persist, and Israel will need to fortify a number of strategically significant areas near the border with Gaza to create a buffer zone to enhance border defense.