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Source: https://substack.com/home/post/p-197079048
Inside the Mind of Hamas
(Substack) Amit Segal - Hamas believed it could wipe out its arch-enemy in one grand operation. In pursuit of this goal, it dragged its allies into a war they did not believe in, and one they would ultimately lose. According to an analysis of captured Hamas documents by Hebrew University's Dr. Daniel Sobelman, Hamas's thinking was the precise opposite of Israeli intelligence assumptions. By 2019, Hamas had come to believe that it was Israel that was deterred from action. In May 2021, Hamas initiated a 12-day conflict over tensions on the Temple Mount. The head of IDF Military Intelligence came out of the operation with the overconfident assessment that "five years of complete calm with Gaza" was achieved. In Gaza, however, Hamas was celebrating a strategic victory. The fighting had sparked unprecedented Israeli Arab uprisings - an internal vulnerability Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar realized could be weaponized as a "nuclear bomb" to destroy Israel. The war had also seen Hamas's first active wartime coordination with Iran and Hizbullah via a joint situation room. Far from a deterrent, the 2021 conflict was a highly successful "dress rehearsal" for the full liberation of Palestine. In June 2022, Sinwar outlined to Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh scenarios for joint action. The first was a full-force, surprise confrontation involving Hamas, Hizbullah, and other regional forces (with Iran supporting from the sidelines) to immediately bring down and end the State of Israel, relying on simultaneous, massive uprisings in Judea and Samaria and among Israeli Arabs. Days later, Haniyeh sat down in Beirut with Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Said Izadi, the head of the IRGC Quds Force's Palestine Branch. Haniyeh reported that Nasrallah had expressed "clear and resolute" support for the first scenario, believing the immediate end of Israel's existence was "realistic and achievable." Izadi supported the plan, but insisted they needed to investigate hurdles before moving forward. During Sinwar's June 2023 visit to Tehran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei bluntly rejected Hamas's push for an immediate, decisive battle, advising Hamas to focus instead on Judea and Samaria while Israel was "gradually" encircled. Still, Sinwar gambled that once the first shots were fired, the sheer scale of the attack would drag his allies into the battle. Violent uprisings in Judea and Samaria and among Israeli Arabs were an absolute requirement in every single scenario. To light that internal powder keg, Sinwar was convinced that capturing and broadcasting "explosive images" right at the start would "trigger a surge of euphoria, frenzy, and momentum" among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. That is why Hamas terrorists wore body cameras and gleefully livestreamed their atrocities.