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Source: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/operationalizing-trilateral-framework-agreement
Making the Trilateral Framework Agreement on Lebanon Work
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Matthew Levitt - On June 26, 2026, the Israeli, Lebanese, and U.S. governments signed the Trilateral Framework Agreement to "establish peaceful neighborly relations" between Israel and Lebanon. The problem is that the conflict in question is being driven by Hizbullah, which initiated attacks against Israel in support of Hamas right after Oct. 7, 2023, and then again in March 2026 in the context of the war with Iran. Hizbullah leader Naim Qassem said the agreement is "null and void" and crossed all of its "red lines." The agreement maps out a series of sequential actions aimed at disarming Hizbullah, enabling the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to restore "effective Lebanese sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory," and ultimately - pending verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantlement of their infrastructure - redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) out of Lebanese territory. A partner in the agreement, the U.S. commits to work closely with both governments to monitor compliance and back implementation. Under this sequenced process, the IDF will continue to clear areas in southern Lebanon of Hizbullah fighters, weapons, tunnels, bunkers, and other infrastructure, and then, after an agreed-upon third party verifies they are clear of non-state armed groups, the areas will be handed over to vetted and "highly qualified" LAF forces, who will assume control and prevent any return or resurgence of Hizbullah or other non-state armed activities. The need for verification is clear - not only confirming that the LAF has moved into areas the IDF has cleared, but, more critically, that the LAF keeps Hizbullah out. That will require substantial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to detect Hizbullah movement into LAF-controlled areas. After the November 2024 ceasefire, the LAF sought to be judged by metrics such as the number of patrols it conducted or sites it inspected, rather than measures of effectiveness like the number of seized and verifiably disposed weapons. This will no longer be the case. As long as Washington sees this effort as a viable and functioning path toward the parties' shared goal of achieving lasting peace and security, and as long as other countries share the burden of any military, intelligence, and financial support mechanism, it just might work. The writer is director of the Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute.