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Source: https://www.jns.org/opinion/tal-beeri/pilot-zones-in-southern-lebanon-a-failure-foretold
Pilot Zones in Southern Lebanon Are Not Sufficient
(JNS) Maj. (res.) Tal Beeri - The pilot zones in Southern Lebanon were intended to serve as a practical test of the Lebanese state's ability and willingness, through the Lebanese Armed Forces, to implement the understandings with Israel: to prevent Hizbullah's return and thwart the rehabilitation of its infrastructure. However, developments in Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh, the first pilot zone, point to the opposite trend. Under cover of the Lebanese Army's presence, Hizbullah apparatuses are returning to the village and re-establishing a civilian foothold there, which could serve as the foundation for renewed military entrenchment. At the end of July, operatives from Hizbullah's Islamic Health Organization were seen operating in Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh, including recovering the bodies of dead Hizbullah members, while accompanied by the Lebanese Army. The organization does not belong to the Lebanese state. During the war, its ambulances were used to transport Hizbullah operatives and weapons, while its medical facilities were used for military-terrorist purposes, including as assembly points and command posts. It was joined on July 29 by the "Help One Another" association (Wa Ta'awanu), another civilian arm affiliated with Hizbullah, to "assist the return of residents." It provides food and meals, maps the needs of the population, and participates in rehabilitation and cleanup activities in cooperation with the Lebanese Army. This is precisely the sphere in which Hizbullah has operated for years. Through health, welfare, education, construction and financial institutions, Hizbullah creates dependence among the population on the services it provides and establishes a civilian support structure that also facilitates its military activity. This highlights the central problem with the pilot-zone model: Dismantling weapons and military infrastructure is not sufficient if, at the same time, Hizbullah's civilian apparatuses are allowed to return to the area. These mechanisms constitute the social, economic and logistical infrastructure upon which Hizbullah is able to rebuild itself. The pilot zone of Zoutar al-Gharbiyeh was supposed to demonstrate that the Lebanese Army was capable of replacing Hizbullah as both the sovereign authority and the provider of services on the ground. Yet the emerging picture is the opposite. Hizbullah's apparatuses are operating alongside the Lebanese Army and under its protection. The failure of the pilot zones began on the day Hizbullah's civilian apparatuses returned. The writer is director of research at the Alma Research and Education Center.