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Source: https://jcfa.org/from-october-7-to-operational-adaptation-the-idfs-transformation-under-fire/
The IDF's Transformation since October 7
(Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs) Oded Ailam - In the modern battlefield, there is a steadily narrowing gap between theoretical talk of a "digital military" and the ability to actually operate such a force under fire, amid chaos, against an adaptive enemy, and at a tempo where a decision delayed by a minute may already be irrelevant. The fighting force that recovered from the October 7 surprise subsequently demonstrated extraordinary tactical and operational adaptability. After the initial shock, the IDF moved within a relatively short period from systemic surprise to a complex, joint, multidimensional offensive campaign, demonstrating the ability of a military organization to learn, change its methods, and rebuild operational effectiveness while fighting. One of the defining characteristics of the campaign has been the development of information- and network-centric warfare. In the networked model, the sensor that detects, the system that analyzes, the commander who decides, and the element that fires all become part of a single network. Information is raw material that is rapidly converted into operational effect. The most important weapon on the modern battlefield is the system that knows faster what to shoot at, who should shoot, and when. The ground challenge in Gaza has been exceptional even by international standards. The IDF has had to employ infantry, armor, combat engineers, intelligence, special forces, stand-off fire, and airpower within a dense urban environment, against an enemy that spent years constructing a system specifically designed to reduce the advantages of a conventional military. In 2025, the U.S. Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned published a detailed study titled Subterranean Operations: Israeli Defense Force Lessons from Gaza. The study explicitly notes the need to examine and update U.S. doctrine based on the IDF's experience in Gaza. For years, a concept developed in Israel that, in many cases, favored deterrence, containment, and risk management over a clear concept of decisive victory. Israel built a force with exceptional technological and operational capabilities, but its strategic concept for employing that force did not always evolve at the same pace. On October 7, the bill came due. Oded Ailam, former head of the Counterterrorism Division in the Mossad, is a researcher at the Jerusalem Center.