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The Modern Blitz: The Collapse of Strategic Warning
(Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies-Bar-Ilan University) Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Yacov Bengo - In the past, the management of borders was entrusted to routine security operations forces that served primarily to prevent "drip" attacks and localized infiltrations. This allowed many states to avoid deploying high-quality forces to their vicinity. Today, the border is a target for a rapid, systemic breach by enemy forces to achieve strategic gains. The border must be transformed from the soft underbelly of the state's security apparatus into a concentration of power sufficient to counter a Blitz threat. Defending nations still operate on the assumption that strategic warning will provide sufficient tactical time to prepare against a developing threat. At the same time, their adversaries are operating according to a doctrine of "immediate occupation and strategic achievement." The Hamas attack on Oct. 7 is an example of a Modern Blitz, designed for tactical paralysis and immediate strategic gain. The technological barrier was breached using simple means, with preemptive paralysis of the observation and communications array via rocket fire and electronic warfare. The forward force was too sparse and collapsed against the mass. In the previous era, the main effort was invested in the proliferation of sensors, centralized control, and warning processes designed to generate a complete picture of what is happening at the border. We are now in a different world of "awareness of targets for immediate strike." Knowing is not enough. It is imperative to strike in time. The direction of the solution is a transition from "Penetration Prevention" to "Immediate Containment." In this concept, the border is a space where he who detects knows how to strike, is capable of operating under disruption, and can absorb and kill. The mission is not to wait for reinforcement but to deny the enemy the advantage from the outset. Building an immediate containment capability requires transferring significant weight from investment in infrastructure and situational awareness to investment in firepower capabilities, command independence, and systemic resilience. The writer served as the head of the IDF's Planning Directorate.